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Abstract  
This paper proposes a general equilibrium model of a monocentric city based on 
Fujita and Krugman (1995). Two rates of transport costs per distance and for the 
same good are introduced. The model assumes that lower transport costs are 
available at a few points on a line. These lower costs represent new transport 
facilities, such as high-speed motorways and railways. Findings is that new 
transport facilities connecting the city and hinterlands strengthen the lock-in 
effects, which describes whether a city remains where it is forever after being 
created. Furthermore, the effect intensifies with better agricultural technologies 
and a larger population in the economy. The relationship between indirect utility 
and population size has an inverted U-shape, even if new transport facilities are 
used. However, the population size that maximizes indirect utility is smaller than 
that found in Fujita and Krugman (1995). 
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1 Introduction
New transport facilities such as high-speed motorway and railways connect points on a
continuous space, providing a better transport service than in the case of ordinary trans-
portation. Users decide whether to use a new transport facility based on its quality and
location, including the entry and exist points of the high-speed motorways and stations.
As the result, there are multiple transportation routes. For example, users’ goods may
pass their final destination on trains or high-spead motorways, but then return to the same
route to reach their destination using local streets after exiting the high-speed motorway
or train station. Thus, by introducing new transport facilities, geographic distances can
differ from route distances, based on the lowest transport costs.
Building railroads or highways is regarded as a policy measure to change the spread of
economic activity. The location of new transport facilities changes location advantages.
Routes that do not run directly between an origin and destination may be chosen because
they provide a better (e.g., quicker and/or cheaper) transport service. Thus, an area
around a new transport facility may enjoy lower transport costs than those areas between
two points of new transport facilities do.
After industrial agglomeration occurs, policymakers may choose to support rural areas
or to narrow the gap between the core region and the periphery. This paper examines
such cases. We clarify the impact of new transport facilities that connect two points of
hinterlands or connect the city and its hinterland, as well as the impact of these facilities
on the relocation of industries. As a result, we determine which options work best in
certain situations.
New transport facilities mean cheaper transport routes are chosen. Fujita and Mori
(1996) introduced two port cities in an urban model of new economic geography. This
paper is similar to that of Fujita and Mori (1996). In Fujita and Mori (1996), port cities
connect a point on a river bank with the opposite side of the river bank. However, Fujita
and Mori (1996) uses only one transport cost per distance for a product, which makes
clear the impact of hub effect. In this paper, two rates of transport costs per distance for
the same good are introduced. Thus, Fujita and Mori (1996) consider that a hub, such as
a port city, provides a gateway to additional demand. Here, the proposed model considers
new transport facilities with lower transport costs that provide better access to the city
or to its hinterland.
Our purpose is to clarify how new transport facilities that connect points on a line,
offering lower transport costs, affect sustainability of a monocentric city. Under a mono-
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centric equilibrium, new transport facilities make a qualitative difference to the city. Thus,
we examine two cases: (1) two points with new transport facilities in the hinterland are
not connected to the city by new transport facilities; and (2) two points with new trans-
port facilities in the hinterland are connected to the city by new transport facilities. For
our purpose, we simply add lower transport costs between the points on a line to Fujita
and Krugman (1995) and Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999; Chapter 9). Because we
focus on the relative location of the city, as in Fujita and Krugman (1995), rather than
the absolute location, as in Behrens (2007), we also examine the size and the shape of
a hinterland. With regard to the emergence of new city, we use a numerical analysis to
examine whether it is profitable for a manufacturing firm to deviate from the monocentric
city.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the proposed
model. Then, the case where new transport facilities connect two points in the hinterland
is analyzed in Section 3. The case where new transport facilities connect the city and two
points the hinterland is analyzed in Section 4. Lastly, Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The model
The underlying structure of this paper’s model is closely related to that of the models in
Fujita and Krugman (1995), Fujita and Mori (1996), Fujita and Mori (1997), Mori (1997)
and Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999). Hence, we only briefly describe its formal
structure.
−f f•0
Figure 1: Monocentric spatial structure
Imagine a long, narrow economy, in which the domain is represented by a bound-
less, one dimensional location space, X, along which lies land of homogeneous quality,
with one unit of land per unit distance. The economy has an agricultural sector and a
manufacturing sector, which supply an agricultural good and a continuum of differen-
tiated manufactured goods, respectively, to consumers (see Figure 1). The agricultural
good production is subject to Leontief technology, using labor and land in a fixed pro-
portion. Land use in the agricultural sector implies that it is necessarily dispersed in
space, [−f, 0) ∪ (0, f ] ∈ X. The production activity of the manufacturing industry ex-
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hibits scale economies, using labor only. We assume that the manufacturing industries
are concentrated at a point (a city), 0 ∈ X.
The economy has a continuum of homogeneous workers with a given size, N . Each
worker is endowed with a unit of labor, and is free to choose both the location and the
sector. Consumers consist of workers and landlords. All landlords are attached to their
land, and consume the entire revenue generated from their land.
There are two types of transport systems: (1) traditional transport systems can ship
an agricultural good or manufactured goods between any locations; (2) new transport
facilities can ship an agricultural good or manufactured goods between given fixed intervals
only such as high-speed motorways or railways. As in Fujita and Krugman (1995), goods
melt away at a constant proportional rate per unit distance in any transport system.
If one unit of an agricultural good or manufactured goods is shipped a distance d by
traditional transportation, exp(−τAd) or exp(−τMd) units arrive. However, if one unit
of an agricultural good or manufactured goods is shipped a distance d only via the new
transport facilities, exp(−τTAd) or exp(−τTMd) units arrive. We assume that the rate of
melting away is smaller when using the new system: τA > τTA and τM > τTM .
Every consumer shares the same Cobb-Douglas utility tastes:
U = A1−µMµ, M =
[ n
0
m(i)ρdi
]1/ρ
where 0 < ρ < 1. The intensity of the preference for varieties in manufactured goods is
expressed as ρ and the elasticity of substitution between any two varieties is expressed as
σ ≡ 1/(1− ρ).
Given nominal wage rates w, and a set of prices, pA and pM for each variety i of
manufactured goods, the budget constraint of a consumer is pAA +
 n
0
pM(i)m(i)di =
w. Utility maximization subject to this budget constraint yields the following demand
functions:
A = (1− µ)wA/pA
m(i) = µwMpM(i)−σGσ−1 for i ∈ [0, n]
where G is the price index for manufactured goods given by
G =
[ n
0
pM(i)−(σ−1)di
]−1/(σ−1)
,
where wA is the nominal wage rate of the agricultural sector and wM is the nominal wage
rate of the manufacturing sector. Hence, the indirect utility function is as follows:
U = (1− µ)1−µµµY G−µpA−(1−µ).
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One unit of an agricultural good is produced using cA units of labor and one unit of
land. The production technology used by manufacturers is the same as in typical NEG
models (Fujita, Krugman and Venables, 1999), such that producing quantity q(i) of any
variety requires labor input l, given by l = F + cMq(i) where F and c are the fixed and
marginal labor requirements, respectively.
We assume that all manufacturing firms are in a single city, located at site r = 0.
Agricultural production extends around the city. We express the f.o.b. price of an agri-
cultural good at each r ∈ X as pA(r), the f.o.b. price of a variety of manufactured goods
at r as pM(r), the nominal wage rate of the agricultural sector at each r as wA(r) and the
nominal wage rate of the manufacturing sector at each r as wM(r).
We assume that cM = ρ and F = µ/σ to normalize the units of output q(i) and the
size n. Thus, expressing the number of manufacturing workers as LM , the number of
firms and the number of varieties become n = LM/µ as Fujita, Krugman and Venables
(1999). Furthermore, the optimal f.o.b. price is obtained as pM(r) = wM(r). We choose
manufactured goods in the city as the nume´raire. Thus, we set pM(0) = wM(0) = 1.
In what follows, we first assume that all manufacturing firms are located within the
city. Then, we derive the condition in which no manufacturing firms deviate from the
city.
3 New transport facilities connecting two points of
hinterlands
In this section, we focus on the case where new transport facilities connect two points
within the hinterland or outside the hinterland, but the facilities are not connected to the
city. We suppose that the points are located at r¯ ∈ X and −r¯ ∈ X. An agricultural good
is produced and exported to the city using only traditional transportation outside the city.
Thus, expressing the delivered price of an agricultural good at the city as pA ≡ pA(0), we
obtain the f.o.b. price of an agricultural good at location r ∈ X: pA(r) = pAe−τA|r|, as in
Fujita and Kruguman (1995).
−f f•0−r¯ r¯
Figure 2: Monocentric spatial structure and the point of new transport facilities outside
the hinterland
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−f f•0−r¯ r¯
Figure 3: Monocentric spatial structure and the point of new transport facilities within
the hinterland
Then, setting the land rents to 0 at the frontier f ∈ X yields the nominal wage
rate of agricultural workers at the frontier: wA(f) = pAe−τ
Af/cA. Because manufactured
goods are produced in the city and exported to the hinterland using only traditional
transportation, we have the price index G(r) = (LM/µ)−1/(σ−1)eτ
M |r|, as in Fujita and
Krugman (1995). Because an agricultural good is supplied from the hinterland to the city
by traditional transportation, the supply of food to the city is SA = 2µ
 f
0
e−τ
A|s|ds. Thus,
using the full employment condition, which yields the city population LM = N − 2cAf ,
the same market clearing condition of an agricultural good in the city is obtained as
Fujita and Krugman (1995). The equality between the real wage rates of an agricultural
worker at the frontier and the real wage rates of a manufacturing worker in the city yields
pA = cAeµ(τ
A+τM )f , which enables us to determine the equilibrium pA and f with the
market clearing condition of an agricultural good in the city.
We use the market potential function of Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999): Ω(r) ≡
ωM(r)σ/ωA(r)σ where ωM(r) and ωA(r) express the real wage rate of manufacturing work-
ers and that of agricultural workers, respectively, at location r. Since the equality between
the real wage rate of agricultural workers at location r and the real wage rate of manu-
facturing workers in the city yields wA(r) = G(r)µpA(r)1−µ, we obtain:
Ω(r) = wM(r)σeσ[(1−µ)τ
A−µτM ]|r| (1)
By introducing new transport facilities, the difference between Fujita and Krugman (1995)
and the model in this subsection is only in the nominal wage rate of manufacturing workers
wM(r) at large r, as shown in Appendix A. That is, there is no difference between Fujita
and Krugman (1995) and this model in terms of the nominal wage rate of manufacturing
workers in the city and around the city. Thus, solving ∂Ω(0)/∂r < 0, a necessary condition
for a monocentric city to be possible becomes (1 − µ)τA − (1 + ρ)µτM < 0, as in Fujita
and Krugman (1995).
The difference between Fujita and Krugman (1995) and the model in this subsection
becomes clear in the market potential function shown in Figure 4.1 The slopes of the
1Figure 4 is constructed using the following set of parameters: cA = 0.5, σ = 4, µ = 0.5, τA = 0.8,
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Figure 4: Market potential functions: FKV and the case with new transport facilities
connecting two points in the hinterland
market potential functions around the city, which show the necessary condition for the
existence of a monocentric city, are the same in both curves in the figure. However, a
new city can emerge at the point of new transport facilities, r = 0.3, even if a new city
does not emerge in the case of Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999). Note that a market
potential function has a cusp around r = 0.3, such as the case after the bifurcation in
Fujita and Mori (1997), and the cusp implies that the lock-in effect works at that point.
In other words, new transport facilities create a shadow around the point where they are
located, similarly to the agglomeration shadow around a city center.
When the point of new transport facilities is located between the city and the frontier,
the gap between the two market potential functions shows the impact of the new transport
facilities. Subtracting the nominal wages without new transport facilities from those with
new transport facilities, denoted as W1(r) and focusing on the area between the city and
the location of the new transport facilities, we obtain ∂W1(r¯)/∂r > 0, as in Appendix A.
Likewise, subtracting the nominal wages without new transport facilities from those with
new transport facilities, denoted as W2(r), and focusing on the area between the location
of the new transport facilities and the frontier, we obtain ∂W2(r)/∂r < 0, if the distance
between the city and the frontier is large enough, otherwise we obtain ∂W2(r)/∂r > 0, as
in Appendix A. If the market potential function without new transport facilities is almost
τM = 1, τTA = 0.08, and τTM = 0.1. The value of f is calculated as f = 1.32126227386 by the numerical
verification method.
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flat around r¯, we can say that the market potential function with the new transport
facilities has a cusp at the point where the new transport facilities exist from the result
we obtained on W1(r¯) and W2(r).
2
Since the new transport facilities do not connect the city and the hinterland in this
section, we can focus on using the new transport facilities to transport manufactured
goods. We obtain that the nominal wage rates at r = r¯ increase as the transport costs
of manufactured goods decrease because of the new transport facilities, as shown in Ap-
pendix A. Thus, we find that the market potential function at r = r¯ shifts upward after
lowering the transport costs by means of the new transport facilities, which will support
the emergence of a new city at r = r¯.
If the location of the new transport facilities shifts slightly towards the frontier, the
value of the market potential function on the city side of the area where new transport
facilities are used decreases. In contrast, the value of the market potential function on the
frontier side of the area increases if the distance between the city and the frontier is large
enough as shown in Appendix A. The value of the market potential function increases as
we get closer to the point of the new transport facility, if the distance between the city and
the frontier is large enough. If the distance between the city and the frontier is short,
locating between the location of the new transport facilities and the frontier is not as
attractive, even if the new transport facility is closer.
Furthermore, when the new transport facilities are located outside the frontier, the
value of the market potential function in the area where the new transport facilities
are used increases as the distance between the new transport facilities and the frontier
decreases, as shown in Appendix A. Thus, we find that we do not need to have the
new transport facilities outside the frontier to increase the value of the market potential
function, because the choice to locate the new transport facilities at the frontier provides
a higher value of the market potential function.
2Since the initial condition of each location on the emergence of a new city in the case without new
transport facilities is not the same in the hinterland, a before and after comparison of the impact of the
new transport facilities is not enough to assess whether manufacturing firms relocate or not. In other
words, we need to focus on the initial condition and the impact of the new transport facilities at the same
time.
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4 New transport facilities connecting the city and
two points in the hinterland
In this section, we focus on the case where the new transport facilities connect the city
and two points in the hinterland. We suppose that the point is located at r¯ ∈ X and
−r¯ ∈ X.
For simplicity, we suppose that the impact of the new transport facilities is the same
on the agricultural good and the manufactured goods, such that τTA/τA = τTM/τM .
To derive the lowest transport costs for manufactured goods sent from the city, solving
−τAr = −τTAr¯ − τA(r − r¯), we obtain:
TMr0 =

τM |r| if 0 < |r| < b+M
τTM r¯ + τM(r¯ − |r|) if b+M < |r| < r¯
τTM r¯ + τM(|r| − r¯) if r¯ < |r|
(2)
where b+M ≡ τ
TM/τM+1
2
r¯.3 The threshold b+M ∈ r, which shows whether the new transport
facilities are used, exists between the city and the location of the new transport facilities.
The transport costs of an agricultural good from r to the city are expressed as TAr0. Since
τTA/τA = τTM/τM , we have b+M = b
+
A. Furthermore, we find that the users of the new
transport facilities in this case are located in b+M < |r|.
Expressing the price of the agricultural good in the city as pA ≡ pA(0) and minimizing
the agricultural transport costs, we obtain the agricultural price at r:
pA(r) = pAe−T
A
r0 (3)
Similarly, we obtain the price index of manufactured goods as follows:
G(r) =
(
LM
µ
)1/(1−σ)
eT
M
r0 (4)
Since ωA(r) = ωM(0) which means that the real wage rate of agricultural workers
currently prevailing at each r is the same as the real wage rate of manufacturing workers
in the center, we obtain the nominal wage rate of agricultural workers at each r:
wA(r) = eµT
M
r0−(1−µ)TAr0 (5)
3Transport rout on TMr0 is drawn as the following figure:
•
0 r¯b+M f .
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Given the location of the closest frontier from the center, fmin, which is the smallest
r such that rent becomes zero, R(r) = max{pA(r) − cAwA(r), 0} = 0, the equality of
the real wage rate of the frontier farmer and a worker in the city yields the price of an
agricultural good in the city center:
pA =
cAeµ(τ
M+τA)fmin if 0 < fmin < b+A: case 1
cAeµ[(τ
TA+τTM )r¯+(τA+τM )(fmin−r¯)] if r¯ < fmin: case 2
(6)
Note that (6) is a strictly increasing function of fmin.
Then, given the location of the closest frontier to the city, we can examine the char-
acteristics of land rent. If µτM − (1− µ)τA > 0,4 from (3) and (5), we obtain pA(r)′ < 0
and wA(r)′ < 0 if r ∈ (0, b+A) ∨ r¯ < r, but pA(r)′ > 0 and wA(r)′ > 0 if r ∈ (b+A, r¯). Thus,
we obtain R(r)′ > 0 if r ∈ (b+A, r¯), but R(r)′ < 0 if r ∈ (0, b+A) ∨ r¯ < r.
Now, we derive the domain of arable lands from the condition of R(r)′ ≷ 0 and
R(r) = 0, with given fmin:
rA = {[−fmin, 0), (0, fmin]} if 0 < fmin ≤ rs1 or rs2 ≤ fmin (7)
rA = {[−fmax,−fmid], [−fmin, 0), (0, fmin], [fmid, fmax]} if rs1 < fmin < b+A (8)
where fmid ≡ rs1 + r¯ − fmin, fmax ≡ fmin + r¯ − rs1, rs1 ≡
(
τTM+τTA
τM+τA
)
r¯ = τ
TM
τM
r¯ = τ
TA
τA
r¯,
rs2 ≡ b+A + r¯ − rs1 = b−A + r¯ and b−A ≡ r¯ 1−τ
TA/τA
2
.
In other words, the hinterland region occurs around r = r¯ if rs1 ≤ fmin < b+A, otherwise
no hinterland region emerges. Note that the price in (6) becomes the same among the six
frontiers that emerge when rs1 ≤ fmin < b+A, as in (8). Using the conditions in (8), we can
explain why the hinterland regions emerge. As a thought experiment, we consider that the
location of r¯ is far from the city center and then decreasing gradually. The new transport
facilities are not used when rs1 > f
min ⇔ τTAr¯ > τAfmin because of the significant
distance between the city and the location of the new transport facilities. Then, shifting
the new transport facilities toward the city, the new transport facilities can be used for
the first time when τTAr¯ = τAfmin, because the transport costs of sending goods to the
city are the same between r¯ and fmin. 5 Then, locating the new transport facilities much
4This condition holds when the necessary condition for the existence of monocentric city in Fujita and
Krugman (1995) is satisfied.
5This figure will be helpful:
•
0 fmin r¯
.
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closer to the city, condition rs1 < f
min is satisfied, which means the additional transport
costs in hinterland regions can be covered under τTAr¯ < τAfmin.
After a hinterland region emerges, condition fmin < b+A, which corresponds to τ
Afmin <
τTAr¯+ τA(r¯− fmin), is satisfied. The condition implies that the transport costs using the
new transport facilities from the frontier located closest to the city among six frontiers are
larger than the transport costs when using traditional transportation from the frontier.
After locating r¯ closer still, the locations fmin and fmid provide the same transport costs
to the city. Thus, we obtain fmin = fmid if fmin = b+A. The transport costs from f
max to
the city become the same as the transport costs from fmin = fmid to the city. 6 Under
this condition, fmax in the case of hinterland regions changes to fmin when the hinterland
regions dissolve into a continuous hinterland. This is why the discontinuity of fmin in the
conditions of (7) and (8) exists.
The shift to a continuous hinterland can be seen from the condition in (7). The
condition rs2 = f
min corresponds to (2r¯ − fmin)τA = τA(fmin − r¯) + τTAr¯. The breaking
point at which a continuous hinterland separates into hinterland regions and a remaining
area occurs at 2r¯ − fmin ∈ X, which is located between r¯ and the city. In other words,
the distance between the breaking point and the city is 2r¯− fmin. The distance from the
breaking point to the new transport facilities and the distance from the frontier to the
new transport facilities are both fmin − r¯. Thus, the condition rs2 = fmin means that
the transport costs by traditional transportation from the breaking point to the city are
the same as: (1) the sum of the transport costs by traditional transportation from the
breaking point to the new transport facilities and those using the new transport facilities
from the location of the new transport facilities to the city: or (2) the sum of the transport
costs by traditional transportation from the frontier to the new transport facilities and
those using the new transport facilities from the facilities to the city. If rs2 ≤ fmin, the
transport costs from the breaking point to the city are lower than the transport costs
from the frontier to the city. That is, land rent at the breaking point is positive if land
rents at the frontier is 0.
Figure 57 shows how to determine the size and shape of arable lands when rs1 <
6This figure will be helpful:
•
0 fmin, fmid r¯ f
max
.
7Figure 5 is constructed using the following parameters: r¯ = 1.6, cA = 0.5, µ = 0.5, τA = 0.8,
τM = 1.0, τTA = 0.6, τTM = 0.75, N = 4.36 and pA = 1.61405. The value of fmin is calculated as
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fmin < b+A. The dotted and bold curves in the figure show p
A(r) and cAwA(r), respectively.
Both curves kink twice where there is no difference between using the traditional or new
transport systems, and where the new transport facilities exist. The vertical line in the
figure shows the location of three frontiers in r > 0. Thus, the area between the two
vertical lines and pA(r) > cAwA(r) can be a hinterland region. The shape of pA(r) is
simply affected by the transport costs of an agricultural good.
Figure 5: Determining the size and shape of arable lands
From (3), (7) and (8), the supply of agricultural goods to the city becomes:
SA =

2µ
τA
(
1− e−τAfmin
)
if 0 < fmin ≤ rs1
2µ
τA
{
1− e−τAfmin + 2e−τTAr¯
[
1− e−τA(fmin−rs1)
]}
if rs1 < f
min < b+A
2µ
τA
{
1− e−τAb+A + e−τTAr¯
[
1− e−τA(r¯−b+A) + 1− e−τA(fmin−r¯)
]}
if rs2 ≤ fmin
(9)
From (7) and (8), the labor in the city becomes:
LM =
N − 2cAfmin if 0 < fmin ≤ rs1 or rs2 ≤ fminN − 2cA (3fmin − 2rs1) if rs1 < fmin < b+A (10)
fmin = 1.30210707971 by the numerical verification method.
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Because the demand of an agricultural good in the city is DA = (1 − µ)wMLM/pA
from (9) and (10), the market clearing condition for an agricultural good yields the price
of an agricultural good in the city:
pA =

(1−µ)(N−2cAfmin)τA
2µ(1−e−τAfmin) if 0 < f
min ≤ rs1: case I
(1−µ)[N−2cA(3fmin−2rs1)]τA
2µ{1−e−τAfmin+2e−τTAr¯[1−e−τA(fmin−rs1)]} if rs1 < f
min < b+A: case II
(1−µ)(N−2cAfmin)τA
2µ
{
1−e−τAb
+
A+e−τTAr¯
[
1−e−τA(r¯−b
+
A
)
+1−e−τA(fmin−r¯)
]} if rs2 ≤ fmin: case III
(11)
Note that (11) is a strictly decreasing function of fmin.
Figure 6: Determining the equilibrium of pA and fmin under Fujita, Krugman and Ven-
ables (1999; Chapter 9)
The values of fmin and pA are derived from the equality of pA in case I of (11) and
that in case 1 of (6) if 0 < fmin < rs1, as shown in Figure 6
8; from case II of (11) and
case 1 of (6) if rs1 < f
min < b+A, as in Figure 7
9; and case III of (11) and case 2 of (6)
if rs2 ≤ fmin, as in Figure 8.10 In the first case, new transport facilities are not used,
because the new transport facilities are too far from the city. In the second case, the
8Figure 6 is constructed using the following set of parameters: cA = 0.5, µ = 0.5, τA = 0.8, τM = 1.0,
τTA = 0.6, τTM = 0.75, and r¯ = 2.
9Figure 7 is constructed using the following set of parameters: cA = 0.5, µ = 0.5, τA = 0.8, τM = 1.0,
τTA = 0.6, τTM = 0.75, and r¯ = 1.6.
10Figure 8 is constructed using the following set of parameters: cA = 0.5, µ = 0.5, τA = 0.8, τM = 1.0,
τTA = 0.6, τTM = 0.75, and r¯ = 1.
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Figure 7: Determining the equilibrium pA and fmin in the case with hinterland regions
Figure 8: Determining the equilibrium pA and fmin in the case without hinterland regions
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new transport facilities are used and the hinterland regions emerge. In the last case, the
new transport facilities, but hinterland regions do not emerge because the new transport
facilities are close to the city.
The first case can be used to determine the impact of the new transport facilities.
Comparing case I of (11) with case II by using a simple calculation, we find that the
curve of case II of (11) is lower than the curve in case I of (11). Comparing case I of (11)
and case III of (11) by using a simple calculation, we find that the curve of case III of
(11) is lower than the curve of case I of (11). Likewise, comparing case 1 of (6) with case
2 of (6), we find that the curve of case 2 of (6) is lower than the curve of case 1 of (6).
Thus, both pA and fmin decrease from the existence of new transport facilities connecting
the city and two points in the hinterland when hinterland regions emerge. However, when
hinterland regions do not emerge, pA decrease from the existence of new transport facilities
connecting the city and two points in the hinterland. In the latter case, the impact of the
new transport facilities on fmin is ambiguous.
Next, we examine the effect of a marginal increase in each parameter on the major
variables of the monocentric equilibrium, as shown in Appendix B. Table 1 summarizes
the results. The parameters µ, cA, τM , and N affected similarly as in Fujita and Krugman
(1995). That is, the impact of τA has been changed by introducing the new transport
facilities.
The new parameters are r¯ and τTA. The case with hinterland regions is simple. If the
transport costs from the new transport facilities decrease, the size of arable land increases,
the population in the city decreases, and the price of an agricultural good decreases. If
the location of the new transport facilities shifts away from the city, the size of arable
land decreases, the population in the city increases, and the price of an agricultural good
increases. The case without hinterland regions is not as simple because the value of µ
changes the result. If the value of µ is large, a decrease in the transport costs from the new
transport facilities or an increase in the distance between the city and the new transport
facilities results in a larger hinterland and a smaller population in the city. Otherwise,
a decrease in the transport costs from the new transport facilities or an increase in the
distance between the city and the new transport facilities has the opposite impact on the
size of the hinterland and the city population. However, if the new transport facilities
are close to the frontier, more distance between the city and the new transport facilities
causes a larger hinterland as in Appendix B. A larger value of µ means that, in contrast to
the market clearing condition, the equality of the real wage rates between manufacturing
workers in the city and workers on the frontier is relatively important as a determinants
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Table 1: Effect of a marginal increase in each parameter on the monocentric equilibrium
With hinterland regions No hinterland regions
fmin Hinterland regions fmin+Hinterland regions LM pA fmin LM pA
r¯ + −2 − + + ±8 ∓11 14
µ − − − + ±5 − + ±15
cA − − − −4 ±6 − −4 ±16
τA ±1 +3 +3 −3 ±7 ±9 ∓12 ±17
τM − − − + + − + +
τTA + −2 − + + ±10 ∓13 +
N + + + +4 + + +4 +
1+ if 2µc
Afmin
1−µ e
µ(τM+τA)fmin
[
µ(1− 3e−τAfmin + 2e−τTAr¯) + 3
]
+ 6cAfmin < N , otherwise
−.
2− if the necessary condition of the monocentric city holds.
3if N is large.
4if τM is large.
5+ if 2cA
(
3µfmineµ(τ
M+τA)fmin−τAfmin + 6fmin − 3µfmin − 2cAr¯τTA/τA
)
> N , otherwise
−.
6+ if ∂Z
∂fmin
2cA
(1−µ)(τM+τA)τA > N where
∂Z
∂fmin
= µ(τM + τA)eµ(τ
M+τA)fmin(1 + 2e−τ
TAr¯ −
3e−τ
Afmin) + 3τAeµ(τ
M+τA)fmine−τ
Afmin + 31−µ
µ
τA > 0, otherwise −.
7+ if N > 3τ
MfmincA
τA+τM
(
µ
1−µe
µ(τM+τA)fmin + 1
)
, otherwise −.
8+ if
τA
[
e−(τ
TA+τA)r¯/2−e−τAr¯−τA(fmin−r¯)
]
−τTA
[
2e−τ
TAr¯−e−(τTA+τA)r¯/2−e−τTAr¯−τA(fmin−r¯)
]
(τA−τTA+τM−τTM )[1−2e−(τTA+τA)r¯/2+2e−τTAr¯−e−τTAr¯−τA(fmin−r¯)] < µ, oth-
erwise −.
9+ if 2µ
2cA(fmin−r¯)
1−µ e
µ[(τM+τA)fmin−(τA−τTA+τM−τTM )r¯][
1− 2e−(τTA+τA)r¯/2 + 2e−τTAr¯ − e−τTAr¯−τA(fmin−r¯)
]
+ 2cAfmin < N , otherwise −.
10+ if µ < 2e
−τTAr¯−e−(τTA+τA)r¯/2−e−τTAr¯−τA(fmin−r¯)
(1+τM/τA)[1−2e−(τTA+τA)r¯/2+2e−τTAr¯−e−τTAr¯−τA(fmin−r¯)] , otherwise −.
11− if τ
A
[
e−(τ
TA+τA)r¯/2−e−τAr¯−τA(fmin−r¯)
]
−τTA
[
2e−τ
TAr¯−e−(τTA+τA)r¯/2−e−τTAr¯−τA(fmin−r¯)
]
(τA−τTA+τM−τTM )[1−2e−(τTA+τA)r¯/2+2e−τTAr¯−e−τTAr¯−τA(fmin−r¯)] < µ,
otherwise −.
12− if 2µ2cA(fmin−r¯)
1−µ e
µ[(τM+τA)fmin−(τA−τTA+τM−τTM )r¯][
1− 2e−(τTA+τA)r¯/2 + 2e−τTAr¯ − e−τTAr¯−τA(fmin−r¯)
]
+ 2cAfmin < N , otherwise +.
13− if µ < 2e−τT A−e−(τTA+τA)r¯/2−e−τTAr¯−τA(fmin−r¯)
(1+τM/τA)[1−2e−(τTA+τA)r¯/2+2e−τTAr¯−e−τTAr¯−τA(fmin−r¯)] , otherwise +.
14The result is ambiguous.
15+ if 2µτA
[(
τTA+τTM
τA+τM
)
r¯ + fmin − r¯
] [
pAe−τ
Afmin+(τA−τTA)r¯ + cA 1−µ
µ
]
> N , otherwise −.
16+ if µ
2
1−µ
cA
τA
pA + µ
1−µ
cA
τA+τM
eµ[(τ
TA+τTM )r¯+(τA+τM )(fmin−r¯)] + c
A
τA+τM
> N , otherwise −.
17+ if N > 2c
A(τAr¯+τMfmin)
τA+τM
, otherwise −. 16
of the locations of the frontiers.
Examining the relationships between real wage rates in manufacturing sector and the
location of the frontier, as shown in Appendix C, we find that the relationship between
the population size in the economy and the real wages in the city has an inverted U-shape,
under the no-black-hole condition, as in Fujita and Krugman (1995). In other words, the
scale economies of the population N dominate when N is small, but the scale diseconomies
of N dominate when N is large.
Furthermore, by using the new transport facilities, the critical population level N ,
such that ∂ω(0)/∂N = 0, with or without hinterland regions, becomes smaller than the
critical population level of Fujita and Krugman (1995), as explained in Appendix C. In
other words, the new transport facilities connecting the city and the hinterland decrease
the size of the population in the economy which maximizes indirect utility.
Using the lowest transport costs from r to s, s 6= r11:
Trs =

τM |r − s| if r¯ < r and b−M < s
τTM r¯ + τMs+ τM(r − r¯) if r¯ < r and 0 < s < b−M
τM(r − r¯) + τTM r¯ + τM |s| if r¯ < r and −b+M < s < 0
τM(r − r¯) + 2τTM r¯ + τM(r¯ − |s|) if r¯ < r and −r¯ < s < −b+M
τM(r − r¯) + 2τTM r¯ + τM(|s| − r¯) if r¯ < r and s < −r¯
τM |r − s| if b+M < r < r¯ and r − b+M < s
τM(r¯ − r) + τTM r¯ + τMs if b+M < r < r¯ and 0 < s < r − b+M
τM(r¯ − r) + τTM r¯ + τM |s| if b+M < r < r¯ and −b+M < s < 0
τM(r¯ − r) + 2τTM r¯ + τM(r¯ − |s|) if b+M < r < r¯ and −r¯ < s < −b+M
τM(r¯ − r) + 2τTM r¯ + τM(|s| − r¯) if b+M < r < r¯ and s < −r¯
τM |r − s| if b−M < r < b+M and 0 < s
τMr + τM |s| if 0 < r < b+M and−b+M < s < 0
τMr + τTM r¯ + τM(r¯ + s) if 0 < r < b+M and −r¯ < s < −b+M
τMr + τTM r¯ + τM(−s− r¯) if 0 < r < b+M and s < −r¯
τM |r − s| if 0 < r < b−M and 0 < s < r + b+M
τMr + τTM r¯ + τM |r¯ − s| if 0 < r < b−M and r + b+M < s
(12)
11The derivation process of Trs is in Appendix D.
17
the market potential function can be expressed as:
Ω(r) = wM(r)σe−σ[µT
M
r0−(1−µ)TAr0] (13)
where
wM(r)σ =
(
Y (0)e−(σ−1)T
M
r0 G(0)σ−1 +

rA
Y (s)e−(σ−1)TrsG(s)σ−1 ds
)
(14)
Y (s) =
wM(s)LM if s = 0 thus Y (0) = LMpA(s) if s 6= 0 (15)
More details on the components of wM(r) can be found in Appendix E.
Solving ∂Ω(0)/∂r < 0, the necessary condition for sustaining a monocentric equilib-
rium is derived, as follows:
(1− µ)τA − (ρ+ 1)µτM < 0 if 0 < fmin ≤ rs1 (16)
(1− µ)τA − (ρ+ 1)µτM − ρ(1− µ)τ
M
1 + 1−e
−τAfmin
2e−τTAr¯[1−e−τA(fmin−rs1)]
< 0 (17)
if rs1 < f
min < b+A
(1− µ)τA−(ρ+ 1)µτM − ρ(1− µ)τ
M
1 + 1−e
−τAb+
A
e−τTAr¯
[
2−e−τA(r¯−b
+
A
)−e−τA(fmin−r¯)
] < 0 (18)
if rs2 ≤ fmin
Since the first and the second terms of (17) or (18) are the same as in (16) and the last
term of (17) or (18) is negative, we find that the existence of the new transport facilities
connecting the city and a point in the hinterland makes the lock-in effect stronger 12 than
in an economy without new transport facilities. Furthermore, it is possible to sustain a
monocentric city by connecting the city and a point in the hinterland with new transport
facilities, even if a monocentric city is not sustainable without new transport facilities.
In Fujita and Krugman (1995), the first and the second terms are explained as a
wage-pull towards the fringe and a demand-pull of city workers towards the center, re-
spectively. The additional new term shows a decrease in demand from the hinterland
when a manufacturing firm moves a short distance away from the city.
12The strength of lock-in effect is measured as Ω(r)′, as in Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999, p.164).
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In the cases with and without hinterland regions, the new term becomes smaller with
a decrease in cA or an increase in N , which we derive using a , shown in Appendix F.
This is because the expansion of the hinterland increases the demand from the hinterland.
Thus, the lock-in effects become stronger with better agricultural technology and a larger
population in the economy. Note that agricultural technology and the population size in
the economy do not affect the lock-in effect in the case without new transport facilities,
as shown in (16).
Figure 9: Market potential function when new transport facilities connect the city and
the hinterland
Next, we compare the market potential functions for the case when the new transport
facilities are located within the city and outside the city and for the case when the facilities
are only outside the city. Figure 9 13 illustrates the market potential function when the
new transport facilities lie inside the city. The value of parameters are the same as in
Figure 4. However, we obtain different values of fmin, which is shown as the bold line
on the horizontal axis of Figure 4 and Figure 9 with Ω(r) = 1. Comparing Figure 4
and Figure 9, we find that (1) the hinterlands expand by connecting the city and the
hinterland with new transport facilities and (2) the value of the market potential function
at r = 0.2 in Figure 4 is almost 0.75, but becomes about 0.6 in Figure 9, which suggests
that the lock-in effect becomes stronger after connecting the city and the hinterland with
13Figure 9 is constructed using the following set of parameters: cA = 0.5, σ = 4, µ = 0.5, τA = 0.8,
τM = 1, τTA = 0.08, and τTM = 0.1 as used for constructing Figure 4. The value of fmin is calculated
by the numerical verification method.
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new transport facilities.
Both Figure 4 and Figure 9 have a cusp in the hinterland. However, Figure 4 shows
that monocentric equilibrium may not be sustained if some manufacturing firms move at
r¯ = 0.3, whereas Figure 9 shows that monocentric equilibrium is sustained. Under our
parameters, we find that new transport facilities connecting only points in the hinterland
support the emergence of a new city more than new transport facilities connecting the
city and the hinterland.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, two transport costs for the same goods are introduced to the model of
Fujita and Krugman (1995), which is a general equilibrium model of a city as a point on
a line. We examined the conditions under which all manufacturing firms agglomerate in
a city and the comparative statics of the monocentric equilibrium.
Of the two transport costs, one is lower than the other. Furthermore, the lower
transport cost is available only at a few points on a line, whereas the higher transport
cost has no restriction on its usage on a line. We suppose that the lower transport costs of
sending between points represent new transport facilities. Then, we supposed two cases
of connections to the new transport facilities. In the first case, points in the hinterland
are on each side of the city and the same distance from the city. Goods are sent from one
point to the other. In the second case, we set the lower transport costs to send goods to
and from one point in the hinterland to the city, and also to and from the other point in
the hinterland to the city.
In the first case, we find that it is better to locate the new transport facilities at the
frontier than outside the frontier for the emergence of an additional city. Furthermore,
the lower transport costs offered by the new transport facilities shift the market potential
function at the point of the new transport facilities upward. Thus, an additional city
may emerge at the new transport facilities if the transport costs of the facilities are low
enough.
In the second case, we find that the location of the new transport facilities determines
the size and the shape of the arable land. If the new transport facilities are not located
near the city, hinterland regions may emerge. The lock-in effects from the existence of the
new transport facilities become stronger in the second case than in the first case. 14 In the
14As IDE-GSM, a multiple-region NEG model with modal choice is used to derive the impact of lowering
transport costs numerically. Some regions have transport hubs such as airports and stations in IDE-GSM,
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second case, the lock-in effects become stronger with better agricultural technologies and
a larger population in the economy. This result may provide an explain on the history of
Chicago which became a megalopolis after the railroads (Cronon 1991). As in Fujita and
Krugman (1995), we found that an inverse U -shape relationships exists between indirect
utility and the population, even if new transport facilities exists. However, the critical
level of the population that maximizes indirect utility is smaller in the second case.
Comparing the two cases, the first case supports a rural area more by the emergence of
new city containing the manufacturing sector because the connection between the city and
the hinterland via the new transport facilities intensifies the lock-in effect. This makes
the monocentric city sustainable and impedes the impact of better access at the new
transport facilities for the emergence of a new city. A larger population in the economy
and labor-saving agricultural technology intensify this tendency. However, new transport
facilities are used to send an agricultural good in the second case, even if a firm in the
manufacturing sector does not emerge in the hinterland. However, new transport facilities
are not used until a firm starts operating around the new transport facility.
As an extension of this paper, it is natural to examine the emergence of new cities or the
emergence of a port city because Fujita and Krugman (1995), as are the studies of Fujita
and Mori (1996, 1997), Fujita, Krugman and Mori (1999), and Mori (1997). Another way
to extend this model is to introduce realistic transport costs, such as increasing returns
to scale in transport sector (Mori 2012).
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whereas others do not. Thus, our results show that by lowering transport costs, stronger lock-in effect in
the city with new transport facilities may emerge, and may sustain firms in the city.
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Appendix A Nominal wage rates when two new trans-
port facilities exist
Depending on the relationship between the location of the frontier and the new transport
facilities, we have three cases on the nominal wage rate of manufacturing workers.
The four route choices are important. The first and second route is the case when the
new transport facilities are located outside the frontier, whereas the third and the last
route are the cases when the facilities are located inside the frontier.
The following figure is useful for the explanation of the first and second cases.
−f f•0−r¯ r¯s r
Expressing the location of dispatching goods as r ∈ X and the destination as s ∈ X,
the first case is when transport routes are limited to the direct link between r and s,
whereas the second case is when goods are transported from r to r¯, from r¯ to −r¯, and
from −r¯ to s.
First, the condition when new transport facilities are never used in any r is derived
under f < r¯ by solving τM(r¯−r)+2τTM r¯+τM(r¯+s) > τM(r−s)⇔ s > r−r¯−r¯τTM/τM ,
where r > 0 and s < 0. Since −f < s < 0, we set −f > r − r¯ − r¯τTM/τM ⇔
r < r¯ + r¯τTM/τM − f and then, since 0 < r < f , we set f < r¯ + r¯τTM/τM − f ⇔ f <
(1+τTM/τM)r¯/2. Thus, new transport facilities are not used when f < (1+τTM/τM)r¯/2.
Second, new transport facilities may be used depending on r under (1+τTM/τM)r¯/2 <
f < r¯. Since new transport facilities are used if s + r¯(1 + τTM/τM) < r and not used if
s + r¯(1 + τTM/τM) > r, new transport facilities are not used if 0 < r < (1 + τ
TM
τM
)r¯ − f :
otherwise the facilities are used.
Third, the transport route is such that goods are transported from a point inside
the location of the new transport facilities, r, to a point inside the location of the new
transport facilities s via the new transport system.
−f −r¯ s •0 r¯r f
Under f < r¯, solving τM(r¯−r)+2τTM r¯+τM(r¯+s) < τM(r−s)⇔ s < r−r¯−r¯τTM/τM ,
where r > 0 and s < 0, setting r¯ < r − r¯ − r¯τTM/τM yields r > r¯τTM/τM , as when the
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route in the above figure is used instead of the direct link between r and s.
Last, the following figure explains the case when goods are transported from a point
outside the location of the new transport facilities, r, to a point inside the other location
of the new transport facilities, s, via the new transport system.
−f −r¯ s •0 r¯ r f
Solving τM(r − s) > τM(r − r¯) + 2τTM r¯ + τM(r¯ + s) yields s < −r¯τTM/τM , as when
the route in the above figure is used instead of the direct link between r and s.
The first case is when 0 < f < (1 + τ
TM
τM
)r¯/2. In other words, the location of the
new transport facilities is far from the frontier. Since nobody use the new transport
facilities, we obtain the same nominal wage rate for manufacturing workers as in Fujita
and Krugman (1995), as follows:
[
wM(r)
]σ
= Y (0)e−(σ−1)τ
MrG(0)σ−1 +
 0
−f
Y (s)e−(σ−1)τ
M (r−s)G(s)σ−1ds
+
 r
0
Y (s)e−(σ−1)τ
M (r−s)G(s)σ−1ds+
 f
r
Y (s)e−(σ−1)τ
M (s−r)G(s)σ−1ds (19)
The second case is when (1 + τ
TM
τM
)r¯/2 < f < r¯. Here, the new transport facilities are
located outside the frontiers, but they are used if manufacturing firms are located near
the frontier. Otherwise, manufacturing firms use only traditional transportation. These
manufacturing firms increase when the transport costs of the new transport facilities
become much lower than the costs of traditional transport. If 0 < r < (1 + τ
TM
τM
)r¯ − f ,
the nominal wage rate of manufacturing workers becomes:
[
wM(r)
]σ
= Y (0)e−(σ−1)τ
MrG(0)σ−1 +
 0
−f
Y (s)e−(σ−1)τ
M (r−s)G(s)σ−1ds
+
 r
0
Y (s)e−(σ−1)τ
M (r−s)G(s)σ−1ds+
 f
r
Y (s)e−(σ−1)τ
M (s−r)G(s)σ−1ds
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whereas, if (1 + τ
TM
τM
)r¯ − f < r < f , we obtain[
wM(r)
]σ
= Y (0)e−(σ−1)τ
MrG(0)σ−1
+
 r−r¯(1+τTM/τM )
−f
Y (s)e−(σ−1)[τ
M (r¯−r)+τTM2r¯+τM (r¯+s)]G(s)σ−1ds
+
 r
r−r¯(1+τTM/τM )
Y (s)e−(σ−1)τ
M (r−s)G(s)σ−1ds
+
 f
r
Y (s)e−(σ−1)τ
M (s−r)G(s)σ−1ds (20)
The third and fourth cases are when r¯ < f , which means that the new transport
facilities are located between the city and the frontier. Depending on the location of
the manufacturing firms, we have three types of firms: (1) firms close to the city use
traditional transportation; (2) firms near the city and near the new transport facilities
and (3) firms near the frontier and near the new transport facilities use both traditional
and the new transport facilities. The last two types differ in terms of the direction of
transportation. If 0 < r < τ
TM
τM
r¯, the nominal wage rate becomes:
[
wM(r)
]σ
= Y (0)e−(σ−1)τ
MrG(0)σ−1 +
 0
−f
Y (s)e−(σ−1)τ
M (r−s)G(s)σ−1ds
+
 r
0
Y (s)e−(σ−1)τ
M (r−s)G(s)σ−1ds+
 f
r
Y (s)e−(σ−1)τ
M (s−r)G(s)σ−1ds
If τ
TM
τM
r¯ < r < r¯, the nominal wage rate becomes:
[
wM(r)
]σ
= Y (0)e−(σ−1)τ
MrG(0)σ−1 +
 −r¯
−f
Y (s)e−(σ−1)[τ
M (r¯−r)+τTM2r¯+τM (−s−r¯)]G(s)σ−1ds
+
 r−r¯(1+τTM/τM )
−r¯
Y (s)e−(σ−1)[τ
M (r¯−r)+τTM2r¯+τM (r¯+s)]G(s)σ−1ds
+
 r
r−r¯(1+τTM/τM )
Y (s)e−(σ−1)τ
M (r−s)G(s)σ−1ds
+
 f
r
Y (s)e−(σ−1)τ
M (s−r)G(s)σ−1ds (21)
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If r¯ < r < f , the nominal wage rate becomes:[
wM(r)
]σ
= Y (0)e−(σ−1)τ
MrG(0)σ−1
+
 −r¯
−f
Y (s)e−(σ−1)[τ
M (r−r¯)+τTM2r¯+τM (−s−r¯)]G(s)σ−1ds
+
 − τTM
τM
r¯
−r¯
Y (s)e−(σ−1)[τ
TM (2r¯)+τM (r+s)]G(s)σ−1ds
+
 0
− τTM
τM
r¯
Y (s)e−(σ−1)τ
M (r−s)G(s)σ−1ds
+
 r
0
Y (s)e−(σ−1)τ
M (r−s)G(s)σ−1ds+
 f
r
Y (s)e−(σ−1)τ
M (s−r)G(s)σ−1ds (22)
Note that we obtain the same nominal wage rates for manufacturing firms around the
city as in Fujita and Krugman(1995).
From (20),
∂[wM(r)]σ
∂r¯
= −τ
A(1 + τTM/τM)
2
1− µ
1− e−τAf
×
{
e[−(σ−1)τ
M+τA]r−τA(1+τTM/τM )r¯
+
2(σ − 1)τM
2(σ − 1)τM − τA e
(σ−1)τMr−2(σ−1)(τM+τTM )r¯+[2(σ−1)τM−τA]f
}
< 0 (23)
Thus, we obtain ∂Ω(r)/∂r¯ < 0 when (1 + τ
TM
τM
)r¯ − f < r < f and f < r¯.
From (21),
∂[wM(r)]σ
∂r¯
= −1
2
1− µ
1− e−τAf e
(σ−1)τMr
×
{
[2(σ − 1)τTM ]e−2(σ−1)τTM r¯
(
2(σ − 1)τM
2(σ − 1)τM − τA e
−τAr¯ − e−τAf
)
+
2(σ − 1)τAτM
2(σ − 1)τM − τA e
−[2(σ−1)τTM+τA]r¯
+
2τA(1 + τTM/τM)[(σ − 1)τM − τA]
2(σ − 1)τM − τA e
[−2(σ−1)τM+τA]re−τ
A(1+τTM/τM )r¯
}
(24)
yields ∂[wM(r)]σ/∂r¯ < 0 under τ
TM
τM
r¯ < r < r¯ if (σ − 1)τM − τA > 0. Thus, we obtain
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∂Ω(r)/∂r¯ < 0 under τ
TM
τM
r¯ < r < r¯ if (σ − 1)τM − τA > 0. Likewise, from (22),
∂[wM(r)]σ
∂r¯
=
1− µ
2(1− e−τAf )e
−(σ−1)τMr
×
(
e2(σ−1)(τ
M−τTM )r¯
{
2(σ − 1)τM [2(σ − 1)(τM − τTM)− τA]
2(σ − 1)τM − τA e
−τAr¯
−2(σ − 1)(τM − τTM)e−τAf
}
+
τAτTM
τM
2[(σ − 1)τM − τA]
2(σ − 1)τM − τA e
−τAτTM r¯/τM
)
(25)
becomes at least positive if the first term in braces becomes positive. The first term in
braces becomes positive if
f > log
(
τM [2(σ − 1)(τM − τTM)− τA]
(τM − τA)[2(σ − 1)τM − τA]
)
+ r¯ (26)
holds. Thus, ∂[wM(r)]σ/∂r¯ > 0 under r¯ < r < f if f is sufficiently large.
From (19) and (21), subtracting the nominal wage rates without new transport facili-
ties from those with the new transport facilities, which is expressed as W1(r), yields
∂W1(r¯)
∂r
=
1
2
(σ − 1)(1− µ)τM
[
1 +
1
1− e−τAf
(
1− 2[(σ − 1)τ
M − τA]
2(σ − 1)τM − τA e
− τAτTM
τM
r¯
)]
+
1
2
1− µ
1− e−τAf τ
Ae[−(σ−1)τ
M−τAτTA/τM ]r¯ 2[(σ − 1)τM − τA]
2(σ − 1)τM − τA
+
1
2
1− µ
1− e−τAf (σ − 1)τ
M 2(σ − 1)τM
2(σ − 1)τM − τA e
(σ−1)τM r¯−2(σ−1)τTM r¯
(
e−τ
Ar¯ − e−τAf
)
> 0
(27)
Likewise, from (19) and (22), subtracting the nominal wage rates without new transport
facilities from those with the new transport facilities, which is expressed as W2(r), yields
∂W2(r)
∂r
=
(σ − 1)(1− µ)
2
τAe−(σ−1)τ
Mr
×
(
1− 1
1− e−τAf
{
e2(σ−1)(τ
M−τTM )r¯
[
2(σ − 1)τM
2(σ − 1)τM − τA e
−τAr¯ − e−τAf
]
+1− 2[(σ − 1)τ
M − τA]
2(σ − 1)τM − τA e
− τAτTM
τM
r¯
})
(28)
Thus, we obtain
∂W2(r)
∂r
≷ 0⇔
f ≶ log
2(σ − 1)τMe[2(σ−1)(τM−τTM )−τA]r¯ − 2[(σ − 1)τM − τA]e− τAτTMτM r¯
[2(σ − 1)τM − τA](e2(σ−1)(τM−τTM )r¯ − 1)
 /τA
(29)
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Substituting r = r¯ into (22), which is the case when r¯ < f , yields Ω(r¯) = w(r¯)σeσ[(1−µ)τ
A−µτM ]r¯,
where
w(r¯)σ = µe−(σ−1)τ
M r¯ +
1− µ
2(1− e−τAf )
×
[
e(σ−1)τ
M r¯
(
2(σ − 1)τM
2(σ − 1)τM − τA e
−τAr¯ − e−τAf
)(
1 + e−2(σ−1)τ
TM r¯
)
− 2(σ − 1)τ
M
2(σ − 1)τM − τA e
−[(σ−1)τM+τAτTM/τM ]r¯ +
2[(σ − 1)τM − τA]
2(σ − 1)τM − τA e
−(σ−1)τM r¯
]
(30)
Solving ∂w(r¯)σ/∂τTM yields ∂w(r¯)σ/∂τTM < 0 ⇐⇒ Λ < 1 if 2(σ − 1)τM − τA > 0 and
∂w(r¯)σ/∂τTM < 0 ⇐⇒ Λ > 1 if 2(σ − 1)τM − τA < 0 where
Λ ≡ τ
A
2(σ − 1)τM
e−[2(σ−1)τ
M−τA](1−τTM/τM )r¯ − e−τA(f−r¯)
1− e−τA(f−r¯)
Thus, we obtain ∂w(r¯)σ/∂τTM < 0. Note that f is not affected by τTM .
Appendix B Derivation of the comparative analysis
on the monocentric equilibrium
B.1 The case with hinterland regions
B.1.1 The impact on the location of frontiers
Rearranging the equality between case II of (11) and case 1 of (6), we obtain
Z ≡ eµ(τM+τA)fmin
(
1− 3e−τAfmin + 2e−τTAr¯
)
−1− µ
2µ
(
NτA
cA
− 6fminτA + 4τTAr¯
)
= 0
Then, we obtain:
∂Z
∂fmin
=µ(τM + τA)eµ(τ
M+τA)fmin
(
1 + 2e−τ
TAr¯ − 3e−τAfmin
)
+3τAeµ(τ
M+τA)fmine−τ
Afmin + 3
1− µ
µ
τA > 0
∂Z
∂r¯
= −2τTAeµ(τM+τA)fmin−τTAr¯ − 2(1− µ)
µ
τTA < 0
∂Z
∂τTA
= −2r¯eµ(τM+τA)fmin−τTAr¯ − 2(1− µ)
µ
r¯ < 0
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∂Z
∂µ
=(τM + τA)fmineµ(τ
M+τA)fmin
(
1− 3e−τAfmin + 2e−τTAr¯
)
+
1
2µ2
(
NτA
cA
− 6fminτA + 4τTAr¯
)
> 0
∂Z
∂τM
= µfmineµ(τ
M+τA)fmin
(
1− 3e−τAfmin + 2e−τTAr¯
)
> 0
∂Z
∂τA
=
fmineµ(τ
M+τA)fmin
[
µ
(
1− 3e−τAfmin + 2e−τTAr¯
)
+ 3
]
+ 3
1− µ
µ
fmin − 1− µ
2µ
N
cA
≷ 0
⇔2µc
Afmin
1− µ e
µ(τM+τA)fmin
[
µ(1− 3e−τAfmin + 2e−τTAr¯) + 3
]
+ 6cAfmin ≷ N
∂Z
∂cA
=
1− µ
2µ
NτA
cA2
> 0
∂Z
∂N
= −1− µ
µ
τA
cA
< 0
Thus, combining the derived results with the implicit function theorem yields ∂fmin/∂r¯ >
0, ∂fmin/∂τTA > 0, ∂fmin/∂µ < 0, ∂fmin/∂τM < 0, ∂fmin/∂cA < 0 and ∂fmin/∂N > 0.
We obtain ∂fmin/∂τA > 0 if N is large, otherwise we obtain ∂fmin/∂τA < 0.
B.1.2 The impact on the size of hinterland regions
Since the size of hinterland regions, EL, is expressed as 2fmin − 2τTAr¯/τA, we obtain
∂EL
∂r¯
≷ 0⇔ −2∂Z
∂r¯
− 2τ
TA
τA
∂Z
∂fmin
= 2eµ(τ
M+τA)fminτTA
×
{
(1− µ)τTA − µτTM
τTA
(1 + 2e−τ
TAr¯ − 3e−τAfmin)− 1− 1− µ
µ
e−µ(τ
M+τA)fmin
}
≷ 0
Since (1 − µ)τTA − µτTM < 0, under the necessary condition for the monocentric city,
using the assumption τTA/τA = τTM/τM , we obtain ∂EL/∂r¯ < 0.
Similarly,
∂EL
∂τTA
≷ 0⇔ −2 ∂Z
∂τTA
− 2 r¯
τA
∂Z
∂fmin
= −2r¯
×
{
1− µ
µ
+ eµ(τ
M+τA)fmin
+(1 + 2e−τ
TAr¯ − 3e−τAfmin)eµ(τM+τA)fmin
(
−1 + µτ
M + τA
τA
)}
≷ 0
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Since (1 − µ)τA − µτM < 0 under the necessary condition for the monocentric city, we
obtain ∂EL
∂τTA
< 0.
Since EL = 2fmin−2τTAr¯/τA, ∂fmin/∂µ < 0 and ∂fmin/∂τM < 0 imply ∂EL/∂µ < 0
and ∂EL/∂τM < 0 respectively.
Since ∂EL/∂τA = 2∂fmin/∂τA + 2τTAr¯/(τA)2, as in the case of ∂fmin/∂τA, large N
provides ∂EL/∂τA > 0.
We obtain ∂EL/∂cA = 2∂fmin/∂cA < 0 and ∂EL/∂N = 2∂fmin/∂N > 0.
B.1.3 The impact on the size of arable land
From fmin + EL = 3fmin − 2τTAr¯/τA, we obtain ∂(fmin + EL)/∂r¯ ≷ 0 ⇔ −3∂Z/∂r¯ −
2 τ
TA
τA
∂Z/∂fmin ≷ 0. Since
−3∂Z
∂r¯
− 2τ
TA
τA
∂Z
∂fmin
= eµ(τ
A+τM )fmin
×
{
−6[(1− µ)τTA − µτTM ](e−τAfmin − e−τTAr¯)− 2µ(τTA + τTM)(1− e−τTAr¯)
}
< 0
we obtain ∂(fmin + EL)/∂r¯ < 0.
We obtain ∂(fmin + EL)/∂τTA ≷ 0 ⇔ −3∂Z/∂τTA − 2 r¯
τA
∂Z/∂fmin ≷ 0. Since
−3 ∂Z
∂τTA
− 2 r¯
τA
∂Z
∂fmin
= −2eµ(τA+τM )fmin
×
{
3(e−τ
Afmin − e−τTAr¯) + µτ
M + τA
τA
(1 + 2e−τ
TAr¯ − 3e−τAfmin)
}
< 0
, we obtain ∂(fmin + EL)/∂τTA < 0.
We obtain ∂(fmin + EL)/∂τA ≷ 0 ⇔ −3∂Z/∂τTA − 2 r¯
τA
∂Z/∂fmin ≷ 0.
We obtain ∂(fmin +EL)/∂τA = −3 ∂Z
∂τA
/ ∂Z
∂fmin
+ 3τTAr¯/τA
2
. Since ∂Z/∂τA < 0 under
large N , we obtain ∂(fmin + EL)/∂τA < 0 if N is large.
From ∂(fmin + EL)/∂µ = 3∂fmin/∂µ, ∂(fmin + EL)/∂cA = 3∂fmin/∂cA, ∂(fmin +
EL)/∂τM = 3∂fmin/∂τM and ∂(fmin+EL)/∂N = 3∂fmin/∂N , We obtain ∂fmin/∂µ < 0,
∂fmin/∂cA < 0, ∂fmin/∂τM < 0 and ∂fmin/∂N > 0 respectively.
B.1.4 The impact on the number of manufacturing workers
From LM = N − 2cA(3fmin − 2τTAr¯/τA), we obtain ∂LM
∂r¯
≶ 0⇔ −3∂Z
∂r¯
− 2 τTA
τA
∂Z
∂fmin
≷ 0.
Since −3∂Z/∂r¯ − 2 τTA
τA
∂Z/∂fmin < 0, we obtain that ∂LM/∂r¯ > 0.
Similarly, since ∂LM
∂τTA
≶ 0⇔ −3 ∂Z
∂τTA
−2 r¯
τA
∂Z
∂fmin
≷ 0. Since−3∂Z/∂τTA−2 r¯
τA
∂Z/∂fmin <
0, we obtain that ∂LM/∂τ
TA > 0.
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From ∂LM/∂τA = −6cA∂fmin/∂τA − 4cAτTAr¯/τA2 and ∂fmin/∂τA > 0 if N is large,
we obtain ∂LM/∂τA < 0 if N is large.
Since ∂LM/∂µ = −6cA∂fmin/∂µ and ∂fmin/∂µ < 0, we obtain ∂LM/∂µ > 0.
Since ∂LM/∂τM = −6cA∂fmin/∂τM and ∂fmin/∂τM < 0, we obtain ∂LM/∂τM > 0.
We obtain ∂LM/∂N ≷ 0⇔ ∂Z/∂fmin + 6cA∂Z/∂N ≷ 0. Thus, we find that large τM
provides ∂LM/∂N > 0.
Since ∂LM/∂cA ≷ 0⇔ fmin∂Z/∂fmin+2τTAr¯/3τA−cA∂Z/∂cA ≶ 0, large τM provides
∂LM/∂cA < 0.
B.1.5 The impact on the price of an agricultural good
From pA = cAeµ(τ
M+τA)fmin , we obtain ∂pA/∂fmin = µ(τM + τA)cAeµ(τ
M+τA)fmin > 0.
Thus, we find that ∂pA/∂r¯, ∂pA/∂τTA and ∂pA/∂N has the same sign as ∂fmin/∂r¯,
∂fmin/∂τTA and ∂fmin/∂N .
A simple calculation yields
∂pA
∂µ
= (τM + τA)cAeµ(τ
M+τA)fmin(fmin + µ
∂fmin
∂µ
) ≷ 0
⇔2cA
[
3µfmineµ(τ
M+τA)fmin−τAfmin + 6fmin − 3µfmin − 2cAr¯τTA/τA
]
≷ N
∂pA
∂cA
= eµ(τ
M+τA)fmin
[
1 + µ(τM + τA)cA
∂fmin
∂cA
]
≷ 0
⇔ ∂Z
∂fmin
2cA
(1− µ)(τM + τA)τA ≷ N
∂pA
∂τA
= µcAeµ(τ
M+τA)fmin
[
fmin + (τM + τA)
∂fmin
∂τA
]
≷ 0
⇔N ≷ 3τ
MfmincA
τA + τM
(
µ
1− µe
µ(τM+τA)fmin + 1
)
A simple calculation yields
∂pA
∂τM
= µcAeµ(τ
M+τA)fmin
[
fmin − (τM + τA) ∂Z
∂τM
/
∂Z
∂fmin
]
Since
∂Z
∂fmin
fmin − (τM + τA) ∂Z
∂τM
= 3fminτAeµ(τ
M+τA)fmin−τAfmin + 3
1− µ
µ
τAfmin > 0
we obtain ∂pA/∂τM > 0.
30
B.2 The case without hinterland regions
B.2.1 The impact on the location of frontiers
Rearranging the equality between case III of (11) and case 2 of (6), we obtain
Y ≡eµ[(τM+τA)fmin−(τA−τTA+τM−τTM )r¯]
×
(
1− 2e−(τTA+τA)r¯/2 + 2e−τTAr¯ − e−τTAr¯−τA(fmin−r¯)
)
−1− µ
2µ
(
N
cA
− 2fmin
)
τA = 0
Then, we obtain:
∂Y
∂fmin
=µ(τA + τM)eµ[(τ
M+τA)fmin−(τA−τTA+τM−τTM )r¯]
×
(
1− 2e−(τTA+τA)r¯/2 + 2e−τTAr¯ − e−τTAr¯−τA(fmin−r¯)
)
+τAeµ[(τ
M+τA)fmin−(τA−τTA+τM−τTM )r¯]e−τ
Afmin+(τA−τTA)r¯
+
1− µ
µ
τA > 0
∂Y
∂r¯
≷ 0
⇔
τA
[
e−(τ
TA+τA)r¯/2 − e−τAr¯−τA(fmin−r¯)
]
− τTA
[
2e−τ
TAr¯ − e−(τTA+τA)r¯/2−e−τTAr¯−τA(fmin−r¯)
]
(τA − τTA + τM − τTM) [1− 2e−(τTA+τA)r¯/2 + 2e−τTAr¯ − e−τTAr¯−τA(fmin−r¯)]
≷µ
Since the sign of the first term of the nume´rater becomes negative if 2τA/(3τA − τTA) <
r¯/fmin, we obtain ∂fmin/∂r¯ > 0 if 2τA/(3τA−τTA) < r¯/fmin. We find that ∂fmin/∂r¯ > 0
if µ is sufficiently large, otherwise ∂fmin/∂r¯ < 0.
From the condition τTM = τTAτM/τA, we obtain
∂Y
∂τTA
≷ 0
⇔µ ≷ 2e
−τTAr¯ − e−(τTA+τA)r¯/2 − e−τTAr¯−τA(fmin−r¯)
(1 + τM/τA)
[
1− 2e−(τTA+τA)r¯/2 + 2e−τTAr¯ − e−τTAr¯−τA(fmin−r¯)]
Thus, we find ∂fmin/∂τTA > 0 if µ is small, otherwise ∂fmin/∂τTA < 0.
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A simple calculation yields
∂Y
∂µ
= [(τM + τA)fmin − (τA − τTA + τM − τTM)r¯]
×eµ[(τM+τA)fmin−(τA−τTA+τM−τTM )r¯]
×
(
1− 2e−(τTA+τA)r¯/2 + 2e−τTAr¯ − e−τTAr¯−τA(fmin−r¯)
)
+
1
2µ2
(
N
cA
− 2fmin
)
τA > 0
Thus, we obtain ∂fmin/∂µ < 0.
A simple calculation yields
∂Y
∂τM
= µ(fmin − r¯)eµ[(τM+τA)fmin−(τA−τTA+τM−τTM )r¯]
×
(
1− 2e−(τTA+τA)r¯/2 + 2e−τTAr¯ − e−τTAr¯−τA(fmin−r¯)
)
> 0
Thus, we obtain ∂fmin/∂τM < 0.
A simple calculation yields
∂Y
∂τA
= µ(fmin − r¯)eµ[(τM+τA)fmin−(τA−τTA+τM−τTM )r¯]
×
(
1− 2e−(τTA+τA)r¯/2 + 2e−τTAr¯ − e−τTAr¯−τA(fmin−r¯)
)
+
1− µ
µ
fmin − (1− µ)N
2µcA
≷ 0
⇔2µ
2cA(fmin − r¯)
1− µ e
µ[(τM+τA)fmin−(τA−τTA+τM−τTM )r¯]
×
[
1− 2e−(τTA+τA)r¯/2 + 2e−τTAr¯ − e−τTAr¯−τA(fmin−r¯)
]
+ 2cAfmin ≷ N
Thus, large N implies ∂fmin/∂τA > 0. Otherwise, we obtain ∂fmin/∂τA < 0.
Furthermore,
∂Z
∂cA
=
∂Y
∂cA
=
1− µ
2µ
NτA
cA2
> 0
∂Z
∂N
=
∂Y
∂N
= −1− µ
µ
τA
cA
< 0
yields ∂fmin/∂cA < 0 and ∂fmin/∂N > 0 in both cases.
B.2.2 The impact on the number of manufacturing workers
From LM = N − 2cAfmin, since ∂LM/∂fmin < 0, the signs become opposite between
∂fmin/∂r¯ and ∂LM/∂r¯.
From ∂LM/∂fmin < 0, the signs become opposite between ∂fmin/∂τTA and ∂LM/∂τTA.
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From LM = N − 2cAfmin, we obtain ∂LM/∂fmin < 0. Thus, we obtain ∂LM/∂µ > 0
and ∂LM/∂τM > 0.
The large N implies ∂LM/∂τA < 0. Otherwise, we obtain ∂LM/∂τA > 0.
From LM = N − 2cAfmin, we obtain ∂LM/∂N ≷ 0 ⇔ ∂Y/∂fmin + 2cA∂Y/∂N ≷ 0.
Since fmin > r¯, we also find that large τM provides ∂LM/∂N > 0.
Furthermore, since ∂LM/∂cA ≷ 0⇔ −∂fmin∂Y/∂fmin+ cA∂Y/∂cA ≷ 0, using fmin >
r¯, large τM provides ∂LM/∂cA < 0.
B.2.3 The impact on the price of an agricultural good
From pA = cAeµ[(τ
TA+τTM )r¯+(τA+τM )(fmin−r¯)], we obtain
∂pA
∂µ
= pA
[
(τTA + τTM)r¯ + (τA + τM)(fmin − r¯)− µ(τA + τM)∂Y
∂µ
]
≷ 0
⇔2µτA
[(
τTA + τTM
τA + τM
)
r¯ + fmin − r¯
] [
pAe−τ
Afmin+(τA−τTA)r¯ + cA
1− µ
µ
]
≷ N
∂pA
∂τTA
= µpA
[
(1 + τM/τA)r¯ + (τA + τM)
∂fmin
∂τTA
]
≷ 0
⇔ ∂Y
∂fmin
r¯(1 + τM/τA)− (τA + τM) ∂Y
∂τTA
≷ 0
Since
∂Y
∂fmin
r¯(1 + τM/τA) − (τA + τM) ∂Y
∂τTA
= (τA + τM)r¯
{
1− µ
µ
− eµ[(τM+τA)fmin−(τA−τTA+τM−τTA)r¯]
×
[
e−(τ
TA+τA)r¯/2 − 2e−τTAr¯
]}
> 0
we obtain ∂pA/∂τTA > 0.
A simple calculation yields
∂pA
∂τM
= µpA
[
fmin − r¯ + (τA + τM)f
min
τM
]
≷ 0
⇔ ∂Y
∂fmin
(fmin − r¯)− (τA + τM) ∂Y
∂τM
≷ 0
Since
∂Y
∂fmin
(fmin − r¯)− (τA + τM) ∂Y
∂τM
= (fmin − r¯)
(
τAeµ[(τ
TA+τTM )r¯+(τA+τM )(fmin−r¯)]e−τ
Afmin+(τA−τTA)r¯ +
1− µ
µ
τA
)
> 0
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we obtain ∂pA/∂τM > 0.
A simple calculation yields
∂pA
∂cA
= eµ[(τ
TA+τTM )r¯+(τA+τM )(fmin−r¯)]
[
1 + µcA(τA + τM)
∂fmin
∂cA
]
≷ 0
⇔ ∂Y
∂fmin
− µcA(τA + τM) ∂Y
∂cA
≷ 0
⇔ µ
2
1− µ
cA
τA
pA +
µ
1− µ
cA
τA + τM
eµ[(τ
TA+τTM )r¯+(τA+τM )(fmin−r¯)] +
cA
τA + τM
≷ N
and
∂pA
∂τA
= µpA
[
fmin − r¯ + (τA + τM)∂f
min
∂τA
]
≷ 0
⇔ ∂Y
∂fmin
(fmin − r¯)− (τA + τM) ∂Y
∂τA
≷ 0
⇔N ≷ 2c
A(τAr¯ + τMfmin)
τA + τM
Since
∂pA
∂fmin
= µ(τA + τM)pA > 0
and ∂fmin/∂N > 0, we obtain ∂pA/∂N > 0.
Appendix C The population and the real wage rates
of the manufacturing sector in the city
The result in Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999) is as follows:
∂ω(0)
∂fmin
= ω(0)
µ(τM + τA)
σ − 1
(
µ− ρ
1− ρ +
τA
τM + τA
e−τ
Afmin
1− e−τAfmin
)
(31)
Similar relationships on fmin are derived in the case with hinterland regions:
∂ω(0)
∂fmin
= ω(0)
µ(τM + τA)
σ − 1
µ− ρ
1− ρ +
τA
τM + τA
e−τ
Afmin
1+2e−τTAr¯
1+2e−τTAr¯+τArs1
− e−τAfmin
 (32)
and in the case without hinterland regions:
∂ω(0)
∂fmin
= ω(0)
µ(τM + τA)
σ − 1
µ− ρ1− ρ + τ
A
τM + τA
e−τ
Afmin
1−e−τAb
+
A+e−τTAr¯[2−e−τA(r¯−b
+
A
)
]
er¯(τ
A−τTA) − e−τAfmin

(33)
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Thus, introducing new transport facilities does not cause qualitative changes to the jus-
tification of Henderson’s assumption of an inverted -U relationship between city size and
the utility of the city’s residents.
Comparing (31) and (32), or (31) and (33), we obtain the result on the critical
population level. Since the relationship between the different parts of (31) and (32)
is (1 + 2e−τ
TAr¯)/(1 + 2e−τ
TAr¯+τArs1) < 1 ⇔ 1 < eτTAr¯, and also since the relation-
ship between the different parts of (31) and (33) is 1−e
−τAb+
A+e−τ
TAr¯[2−e−τA(r¯−b
+
A
)
]
er¯(τ
A−τTA) < 1 ⇔
e−
τTA+τA
2
r¯(e−
τTA+τA
2
r¯ − 2) < 1 − e−τAr¯, the value of fmin such that ∂ω(0)/∂fmin = 0 in
(31) is larger than the value of fmin such that ∂ω(0)/∂fmin = 0 in (32) or in (33).
Appendix D Derivation of the lowest transport costs
when three new transport facilities ex-
ist
Here, we examine the lowest transport costs, Trs under the existence of new transport
facilities between 0 ∈ X and r¯ ∈ X, as well as between −r¯ ∈ X and 0 with τTM instead
of τM > τTM .
Focusing on the cases in the following figure:
•
0 s r¯ r , setting 0 < s <
r¯ < r, since τM(r¯ − s) ≷ τTM r¯ + τMs⇔ b−M ≷ s, we obtain Trs = τM(r − s) if r¯ < r and
b−M < s and Trs = τ
TM r¯ + τMs+ τM(r − r¯) if r¯ < r and 0 < s < b−M .
Focusing on the cases in the following figure:
−r¯ s •0 b−M r¯ r ,
setting r¯ < r and −r¯ < s < 0, since τM(r − r¯) + τTM r¯ + τM |s| ≷ τM(r − r¯) + 2τTM r¯ +
τM(r¯ − |s|) ⇔ −b+M ≷ s, we obtain Trs = τM(r − r¯) + τTM r¯ + τM |s| if r¯ < r and
−b+M < s < 0 and Trs = τM(r − r¯) + 2τTM r¯ + τM(r¯ − |s|) if r¯ < r and −r¯ < s < −b+M .
Setting r¯ < r and s < −r¯, since τTM < τM , we obtain Trs = τM(r − r¯) + 2τTM r¯ +
τM(|s|−r¯), which is depicted in the following figure. s −r¯
•
0 r¯ r .
Focusing on the cases in the following figure:
•
0 s r r¯ , setting 0 <
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s < r < r¯, we obtain τM(r − s) ≷ τM(r¯ − r) + τTM r¯ + τMs ⇔ r − b+M ≷ s. Since
r − b+M > s > 0 ⇔ r > b+M , we obtain Trs = τM(r¯ − r) + τTM r¯ + τMs if b+M < r < r¯ and
0 < s < r − b+M , and Trs = τM(r − s) if r − b+M < s < r < r¯.
Focusing on the cases in the following figure:
•
0, s r r¯
, setting s = 0,
we obtain 0 < r < r¯, τMr ≷ τM(r¯ − r) + τTM r¯ ⇔ r ≷ b+M . This result is used for the
initial setting of some of the following cases.
Focusing on the cases in the following figure: −r¯ s
•
0 r r¯ ,
setting bM+ < r < r¯ and −r¯ < s < 0, τM(r¯ − r) + τTM r¯ + τM |s| ≷ τM(r¯ − r) + 2τTM r¯ +
τM(|s| − r)⇔ −b+M ≷ s. Thus, we obtain Trs = τM(r¯ − r) + τTM r¯ + τM |s| if bM+ < r < r¯
and −r¯ < s < −b+M , and Trs = τM(r¯ − r) + 2τTM r¯ + τM(|s| − r) if b+M < r < r¯ and
−b+M < s < 0.
Setting b+M < r < r¯ and s < −r¯, we obtain Trs = τM(r¯− r) + 2τTM r¯ since τTM < τM ,
which is depicted in the following figure:
s−r¯ •0 r r¯ .
Focusing on the cases in the following figure: −r¯ s
•
0 r r¯ ,
setting −r¯ < s < 0 < r < b+M , τMr+ τM |s| ≷ τMr+ τTM r¯+ τM(r¯+ s)⇔ −b+M ≷ s yields
Trs = τ
Mr + τM |s| if −b+M < s < 0 and 0 < r < b+M , and Trs = τMr + τTM r¯ + τM(r¯ + s)
if −r¯ < s < −b+M and 0 < r < b+M .
Setting 0 < r < b+M and s < −r¯, we obtain Trs = τMr+τTM r¯+τM(−s−r¯) since τTM <
τM , which is depicted in the following figure:
s−r¯ •0 r r¯ .
Focusing on the cases in the following figure:
•
0 r s r¯ , setting 0 < r <
s < r¯, we obtain τM(s − r) ≷ τMr + τTM r¯ + τM(r¯ − s) ⇔ s ≷ r + b+M . Since r¯ > s >
r+b+M ⇔ b−M > r, Trs = τM(s−r) if 0 < r < s < r+b+M , and Trs = τMr+τTM r¯+τM(r¯−s)
if 0 < r < b−M and r + b
+
M < s < r¯.
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Focusing on the cases in the following figure:
•
0 r r¯ s , setting 0 < r <
r¯ < s, τM(s−r) ≷ τMr+τTM r¯+τM(s− r¯)⇔ b−M ≷ r. Trs = τM(s−r) if b−M < r < r¯ < s
and Trs = τ
Mr + τTM r¯ + τM(s− r¯) if 0 < r < b−M and r¯ < s.
Summarizing the above results yields (12).
Appendix E Components of market potential func-
tions when transport facilities are con-
nected to the city
A simple calculation yields
Y (0)e−(σ−1)Tr0G(0)σ−1 =

µe−(σ−1)τ
M |r| if 0 < |r| < b+M
µe−(σ−1)[τ
TM r¯+τM (r¯−|r|)] if b+A < |r| < r¯
µe−(σ−1)[τ
TM r¯+τM (|r|−r¯)] if r¯ < |r|
(34)
and
Y (s)G(s)σ−1 =

pA
LM
µeτ
M (σ−1)|s|−τA|s| if 0 < |s| < b+M
pA
LM
µe(σ−1)[τ
TM r¯+τM (r¯−|s|)]−τTAr¯−τA(r¯−|s|) if b+A < |s| < r¯
pA
LM
µe(σ−1)[τ
TM r¯+τM (|s|−r¯)]−τTAr¯−τA(|s|−r¯) if r¯ < |s|
(35)
Then, from (12) and (35), we obtain, if 0 < r < b−M ,
Y (s)G(s)σ−1e−(σ−1)Trs
pAµ/LM
=

e(τ
A−τTA)r¯−(σ−1)τMreτ
As if s < −r¯
e−(τ
TA+τA)r¯−(σ−1)τMre−τ
As if −r¯ ≤ s ≤ −b+M
e−(σ−1)τ
Mreτ
As if −b+M < s < 0
e−(σ−1)τ
Mre[2(σ−1)τ
M−τA]s if 0 < s < r
e(σ−1)τ
Mre−τ
As if r ≤ s ≤ b+M
e[(σ−1)(τ
TM+τM )−τTA−τA]r¯+(σ−1)τMre[−2(σ−1)τ
M+τA]s if b+M < s ≤ r + b+M
e−(τ
TA+τA)r¯−(σ−1)τMreτ
As if r + b+M < s ≤ r¯
e(−τ
TA+τA)r¯−(σ−1)τMre−τ
As if r¯ < s
(36)
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Similarly, we obtain, if b−M ≤ r < b+M ,
Y (s)G(s)σ−1e−(σ−1)Trs
pAµ/LM
=

e(τ
A−τTA)r¯−(σ−1)τMreτ
As if s < −r¯
e−(τ
TA+τA)r¯−(σ−1)τMre−τ
As if −r¯ ≤ s ≤ −b+M
e−(σ−1)τ
Mreτ
As if −b+M < s < 0
e−(σ−1)τ
Mre[2(σ−1)τ
M−τA]s if 0 < s ≤ r
e(σ−1)τ
Mre−τ
As if r < s < b+M
e[(σ−1)(τ
TM+τM )−τTA−τA]r¯+(σ−1)τMre[−2(σ−1)τ
M+τA]s if b+M ≤ s ≤ r¯
e[(σ−1)(τ
TM−τM )−τTA+τA]r¯+(σ−1)τMre−τ
As if r¯ < s
(37)
Likewise, if b+M ≤ r ≤ r¯, we obtain
Y (s)G(s)σ−1e−(σ−1)Trs
pAµ/LM
=

e[−(σ−1)(τ
TM+τM )−τTA+τA]r¯+(σ−1)τMreτ
As if s < −r¯
e[−(σ−1)(τ
TM+τM )−τTA−τA]r¯+(σ−1)τMre−τ
As if −r¯ ≤ s ≤ −b+M
e−(σ−1)(τ
M+τTM )r¯+(σ−1)τMreτ
As if −b+M < s < 0
e−(σ−1)(τ
M+τTM )r¯+(σ−1)τMre−τ
As if 0 < s < r − b+M
e−(σ−1)τ
Mre[2τ
M (σ−1)−τA]s if r − b+M ≤ s < b+M
e[(σ−1)(τ
TM+τM )−τTA−τA]r¯−(σ−1)τMreτ
As if b+M ≤ s ≤ r
e[(σ−1)(τ
TM+τM )−τTA−τA]r¯+(σ−1)τMre[−2(σ−1)τ
M+τA]s if r < s ≤ r¯
e[(σ−1)(τ
TM−τM )−τTA+τA]r¯+(σ−1)τMre−τ
As if r¯ < s
(38)
Lastly, if r¯ < r, we obtain
Y (s)G(s)σ−1e−(σ−1)Trs
pAµ/LM
=

e[(σ−1)(−τ
TM+τM )−τTA+τA]r¯−(σ−1)τMreτ
As if s < −r¯
e[(σ−1)(−τ
TM+τM )−τTA−τA]r¯−(σ−1)τMre−τ
As if −r¯ ≤ s ≤ −b+M
e−(σ−1)(τ
TM−τM )r¯−(σ−1)τMreτ
As if −b+M < s < 0
e−(σ−1)(τ
TM−τM )r¯−(σ−1)τMre−τ
As if 0 < s < b−M
e−(σ−1)τ
Mre[2(σ−1)τ
M−τA]s if b−M ≤ s < b+M
e[(σ−1)(τ
TM+τM )−τTA−τA]r¯−(σ−1)τMreτ
As if b+M ≤ s ≤ r¯
e[(σ−1)(τ
TM−τM )−τTA+τA]r¯−(σ−1)τMre[2(σ−1)τ
M−τA]s if r¯ < s ≤ r
e[(σ−1)(τ
TM−τM )−τTA+τA]r¯+(σ−1)τMre−τ
As if r < s
(39)
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From (11), we obtain:
µpA
LM
=

(1−µ)τA
2(1−e−τAfmin) if f
min < rs1
(1−µ)τA
2{1−e−τAfmin+2e−τTAr¯[1−e−τA(fmin−rs1)]} if rs1 < f
min < b+A
(1−µ)τA
2
{
1−e−τAb
+
A+e−τTAr¯
[
1−e−τA(r¯−b
+
A
)
+1−e−τA(fmin−r¯)
]} if rs2 < fmin
(40)
Furthermore, we need to clarify the ranges of s ∈ X that depend on fmin. For this
purpose, we obtain 0 < rs1 < b
+
A/2 < b
−
M < b
+
A = b
+
M < r¯ if 0 < τ
TA/τA < 1/3, whereas
we obtain 0 < b−M ≤ b+A/2 ≤ rs1 < b+A = b+M < r¯ if 1/3 ≤ τTA/τA < 1. Thus, six cases
emerge, depending on τTA/τA and/or fmin. From (8), (34), (36), (37), (38), (39), and
(40), we can derive a part of the nominal wage rates of the manufacturing sector at r ∈ X
as follows.
First, in the case of 0 < τTA/τA < 1/3 and fmin < rs1, or 1/3 ≤ τTA/τA < 1 and
fmin < b−A, if 0 < r ≤ fmin, we obtain:
wM(r)σ − Y (0)e−(σ−1)Tr0G(0)σ−1
pAµ/LM
= e−(σ−1)τ
Mr
 0
−fmin
eτ
As ds
+ e−(σ−1)τ
Mr
 r
0
e[2(σ−1)τ
M−τA]s ds
+ e(σ−1)τ
Mr
 fmin
r
e−τ
As ds (41)
If fmin < r < b+M , we obtain:
wM(r)σ − Y (0)e−(σ−1)Tr0G(0)σ−1
pAµ/LM
= e−(σ−1)τ
Mr
 0
−fmin
eτ
As ds
+ e−(σ−1)τ
Mr
 fmin
0
e[2(σ−1)τ
M−τA]s ds (42)
If b+M ≤ r < fmin + b+M , we obtain:
wM(r)σ − Y (0)e−(σ−1)Tr0G(0)σ−1
pAµ/LM
= e−(σ−1)(τ
M+τTM )r¯+(σ−1)τMr
 0
−fmin
eτ
As ds
+ e−(σ−1)(τ
M+τTM )r¯+(σ−1)τMr
 r−b+M
0
e−τ
As ds
+ e−(σ−1)τ
Mr
 fmin
r−b+M
e[2τ
M (σ−1)−τA]s ds (43)
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If fmin + b+M ≤ r ≤ r¯, we obtain:
wM(r)σ − Y (0)e−(σ−1)Tr0G(0)σ−1
pAµ/LM
= e−(σ−1)(τ
M+τTM )r¯+(σ−1)τMr
 0
−fmin
eτ
As ds
+ e−(σ−1)(τ
M+τTM )r¯+(σ−1)τMr
 fmin
0
e−τ
As ds (44)
If r¯ < r, we obtain:
wM(r)σ − Y (0)e−(σ−1)Tr0G(0)σ−1
pAµ/LM
= e−(σ−1)(τ
TM−τM )r¯−(σ−1)τMr
 0
−fmin
eτ
As ds
+ e−(σ−1)(τ
TM−τM )r¯−(σ−1)τMr
 fmin
0
e−τ
As ds (45)
Second, in the case of 1/3 ≤ τTA/τA < 1 and b−A < fmin < rs1, if 0 < r ≤ fmin, we
obtain (41). If fmin < r ≤ b+M , we obtain (42). If b+M < r ≤ r¯, we obtain (43). If r¯ < r,
we obtain:
wM(r)σ − Y (0)e−(σ−1)Tr0G(0)σ−1
pAµ/LM
= e−(σ−1)(τ
TM−τM )r¯−(σ−1)τMr
 0
−fmin
eτ
As ds
+ e−(σ−1)(τ
TM−τM )r¯−(σ−1)τMr
 b−M
0
e−τ
As ds
+ e−(σ−1)τ
Mr
 fmin
b−M
e[2(σ−1)τ
M−τA]s ds (46)
Third, in the case of 0 < τTA/τA < 1/3 and rs1 < f
min < b+A/2 < b
−
A, if 0 < r ≤ fmin,
we otain:
wM(r)σ − Y (0)e−(σ−1)Tr0G(0)σ−1
pAµ/LM
= e(τ
A−τTA)r¯−(σ−1)τMr
 −r¯
−fmax
eτ
As ds
+ e−(τ
TA+τA)r¯−(σ−1)τMr
 −fmid
−r¯
e−τ
As ds
+ e−(σ−1)τ
Mr
 0
−fmin
eτ
As ds
+ e−(σ−1)τ
Mr
 r
0
e[2(σ−1)τ
M−τA]s ds
+ e(σ−1)τ
Mr
 fmin
r
e−τ
As ds
+ e−(τ
TA+τA)r¯−(σ−1)τMr
 r¯
rs1+r¯−fmin
eτ
As ds
+ e(−τ
TA+τA)r¯−(σ−1)τMr
 fmax
r¯
e−τ
As ds (47)
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If fmin < r ≤ b+M − fmin, we obtain:
wM(r)σ − Y (0)e−(σ−1)Tr0G(0)σ−1
pAµ/LM
= e(τ
A−τTA)r¯−(σ−1)τMr
 −r¯
−fmax
eτ
As ds
+ e−(τ
TA+τA)r¯−(σ−1)τMr
 −fmid
−r¯
e−τ
As ds
+ e−(σ−1)τ
Mr
 0
−fmin
eτ
As ds
+ e−(σ−1)τ
Mr
 fmin
0
e[2(σ−1)τ
M−τA]s ds
+ e−(τ
TA+τA)r¯−(σ−1)τMr
 r¯
rs1+r¯−fmin
eτ
As ds
+ e(−τ
TA+τA)r¯−(σ−1)τMr
 fmax
r¯
e−τ
As ds (48)
If b+M − fmin < r ≤ b−M , we obtain:
wM(r)σ − Y (0)e−(σ−1)Tr0G(0)σ−1
pAµ/LM
= e(τ
A−τTA)r¯−(σ−1)τMr
 −r¯
−fmax
eτ
As ds
+ e−(τ
TA+τA)r¯−(σ−1)τMr
 −fmid
−r¯
e−τ
As ds
+ e−(σ−1)τ
Mr
 0
−fmin
eτ
As ds
+ e−(σ−1)τ
Mr
 fmin
0
e[2(σ−1)τ
M−τA]s ds
+ e[(σ−1)(τ
TM+τM )−τTA−τA]r¯+(σ−1)τMr
 r+b+M
rs1+r¯−fmin
e[−2(σ−1)τ
M+τA]s ds
+ e−(τ
TA+τA)r¯−(σ−1)τMr
 r¯
r+b+M
eτ
As ds
+ e(−τ
TA+τA)r¯−(σ−1)τMr
 fmax
r¯
e−τ
As ds (49)
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If b−M < r ≤ b+M , we obtain:
wM(r)σ − Y (0)e−(σ−1)Tr0G(0)σ−1
pAµ/LM
= e(τ
A−τTA)r¯−(σ−1)τMr
 −r¯
−fmax
eτ
As ds
+ e−(τ
TA+τA)r¯−(σ−1)τMr
 −fmid
−r¯
e−τ
As ds
+ e−(σ−1)τ
Mr
 0
−fmin
eτ
As ds
+ e−(σ−1)τ
Mr
 fmin
0
e[2(σ−1)τ
M−τA]s ds
+ e[(σ−1)(τ
TM+τM )−τTA−τA]r¯+(σ−1)τMr
 r¯
fmid
e[−2(σ−1)τ
M+τA]s ds
+ e[(σ−1)(τ
TM−τM )−τTA+τA]r¯+(σ−1)τMr
 fmax
r¯
e−τ
As ds
(50)
If b+M < r ≤ fmin + b+M , we obtain:
wM(r)σ − Y (0)e−(σ−1)Tr0G(0)σ−1
pAµ/LM
= e[−(σ−1)(τ
TM+τM )−τTA+τA]r¯+(σ−1)τMr
 −r¯
−fmax
eτ
As ds
+ e[−(σ−1)(τ
TM+τM )−τTA−τA]r¯+(σ−1)τMr
 −fmid
−r¯
e−τ
As ds
+ e−(σ−1)(τ
M+τTM )r¯+(σ−1)τMr
 0
−fmin
eτ
As ds
+ e−(σ−1)(τ
M+τTM )r¯+(σ−1)τMr
 r−b+M
0
e−τ
As ds
+ e−(σ−1)τ
Mr
 fmin
r−b+M
e[2τ
M (σ−1)−τA]s ds
+ e[(σ−1)(τ
TM+τM )−τTA−τA]r¯+(σ−1)τMr
 r¯
rs1+r¯−fmin
e[−2(σ−1)τ
M+τA]s ds
+ e[(σ−1)(τ
TM−τM )−τTA+τA]r¯+(σ−1)τMr
 fmax
r¯
e−τ
As ds
(51)
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If fmin + b+M < r ≤ rs1 + r¯ − fmin, we obtain:
wM(r)σ − Y (0)e−(σ−1)Tr0G(0)σ−1
pAµ/LM
= e[−(σ−1)(τ
TM+τM )−τTA+τA]r¯+(σ−1)τMr
 −r¯
−fmax
eτ
As ds
+ e[−(σ−1)(τ
TM+τM )−τTA−τA]r¯+(σ−1)τMr
 −fmid
−r¯
e−τ
As ds
+ e−(σ−1)(τ
M+τTM )r¯+(σ−1)τMr
 0
−fmin
eτ
As ds
+ e−(σ−1)(τ
M+τTM )r¯+(σ−1)τMr
 fmin
0
e−τ
As ds
+ e[(σ−1)(τ
TM+τM )−τTA−τA]r¯+(σ−1)τMr
 r¯
rs1+r¯−fmin
e[−2(σ−1)τ
M+τA]s ds
+ e[(σ−1)(τ
TM−τM )−τTA+τA]r¯+(σ−1)τMr
 fmax
r¯
e−τ
As ds
(52)
If rs1 + r¯ − fmin < r ≤ r¯, we obtain:
wM(r)σ − Y (0)e−(σ−1)Tr0G(0)σ−1
pAµ/LM
= e[−(σ−1)(τ
TM+τM )−τTA+τA]r¯+(σ−1)τMr
 −r¯
−fmax
eτ
As ds
+ e[−(σ−1)(τ
TM+τM )−τTA−τA]r¯+(σ−1)τMr
 −fmid
−r¯
e−τ
As ds
+ e−(σ−1)(τ
M+τTM )r¯+(σ−1)τMr
 0
−fmin
eτ
As ds
+ e−(σ−1)(τ
M+τTM )r¯+(σ−1)τMr
 fmin
0
e−τ
As ds
+ e[(σ−1)(τ
TM+τM )−τTA−τA]r¯−(σ−1)τMr
 r
rs1+r¯−fmin
eτ
As ds
+ e[(σ−1)(τ
TM+τM )−τTA−τA]r¯+(σ−1)τMr
 r¯
r
e[−2(σ−1)τ
M+τA]s ds
+ e[(σ−1)(τ
TM−τM )−τTA+τA]r¯+(σ−1)τMr
 fmax
r¯
e−τ
As ds
(53)
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If r¯ < r ≤ fmin + r¯ − rs1, we obtain:
wM(r)σ − Y (0)e−(σ−1)Tr0G(0)σ−1
pAµ/LM
= e[(σ−1)(−τ
TM+τM )−τTA+τA]r¯−(σ−1)τMr
 −r¯
−fmax
eτ
As ds
+ e[(σ−1)(−τ
TM+τM )−τTA−τA]r¯−(σ−1)τMr
 −fmid
−r¯
e−τ
As ds
+ e−(σ−1)(τ
TM−τM )r¯−(σ−1)τMr
 0
−fmin
eτ
As ds
+ e−(σ−1)(τ
TM−τM )r¯−(σ−1)τMr
 fmin
0
e−τ
As ds
+ e[(σ−1)(τ
TM+τM )−τTA−τA]r¯−(σ−1)τMr
 r¯
fmid
eτ
As ds
+ e[(σ−1)(τ
TM−τM )−τTA+τA]r¯−(σ−1)τMr
 r
r¯
e[2(σ−1)τ
M−τA]s ds
+ e[(σ−1)(τ
TM−τM )−τTA+τA]r¯+(σ−1)τMr
 fmax
r
e−τ
As ds
(54)
If fmin + r¯ − rs1 < r, we obtain:
wM(r)σ − Y (0)e−(σ−1)Tr0G(0)σ−1
pAµ/LM
= e[(σ−1)(−τ
TM+τM )−τTA+τA]r¯−(σ−1)τMr
 −r¯
−fmax
eτ
As ds
+ e[(σ−1)(−τ
TM+τM )−τTA−τA]r¯−(σ−1)τMr
 −fmid
−r¯
e−τ
As ds
+ e−(σ−1)(τ
TM−τM )r¯−(σ−1)τMr
 0
−fmin
eτ
As ds
+ e−(σ−1)(τ
TM−τM )r¯−(σ−1)τMr
 fmin
0
e−τ
As ds
+ e[(σ−1)(τ
TM+τM )−τTA−τA]r¯−(σ−1)τMr
 r¯
fmid
eτ
As ds
+ e[(σ−1)(τ
TM−τM )−τTA+τA]r¯−(σ−1)τMr
 fmax
r¯
e[2(σ−1)τ
M−τA]s ds
(55)
Fourth, in the case of 0 < τTA/τA < 1/3 and rs1 < b
+
A/2 < f
min, if 0 < r ≤ b+M −fmin,
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we obtain (47). If b+M − fmin < r ≤ fmin, we obtain:
wM(r)σ − Y (0)e−(σ−1)Tr0G(0)σ−1
pAµ/LM
= e(τ
A−τTA)r¯−(σ−1)τMr
 −r¯
−fmax
eτ
As ds
+ e−(τ
TA+τA)r¯−(σ−1)τMr
 −fmid
−r¯
e−τ
As ds
+ e−(σ−1)τ
Mr
 0
−fmin
eτ
As ds
+ e−(σ−1)τ
Mr
 r
0
e[2(σ−1)τ
M−τA]s ds
+ e(σ−1)τ
Mr
 fmin
r
e−τ
As ds
+ e[(σ−1)(τ
TM+τM )−τTA−τA]r¯+(σ−1)τMr
 r+b+M
rs1+r¯−fmin
e[−2(σ−1)τ
M+τA]s ds
+ e−(τ
TA+τA)r¯−(σ−1)τMr
 r¯
r+b+M
eτ
As ds
+ e(−τ
TA+τA)r¯−(σ−1)τMr
 fmax
r¯
e−τ
As ds (56)
If fmin < r ≤ b−M , we obtain (49). If b−M < r ≤ b+M , we obtain (50). If b+M < r ≤
rs1 + r¯ − fmin, we obtain (51). If rs1 + r¯ − fmin < r ≤ fmin + b+M , we obtain:
wM(r)σ − Y (0)e−(σ−1)Tr0G(0)σ−1
pAµ/LM
= e[−(σ−1)(τ
TM+τM )−τTA+τA]r¯+(σ−1)τMr
 −r¯
−fmax
eτ
As ds
+ e[−(σ−1)(τ
TM+τM )−τTA−τA]r¯+(σ−1)τMr
 −fmid
−r¯
e−τ
As ds
+ e−(σ−1)(τ
M+τTM )r¯+(σ−1)τMr
 0
−fmin
eτ
As ds
+ e−(σ−1)(τ
M+τTM )r¯+(σ−1)τMr
 r−b+M
0
e−τ
As ds
+ e−(σ−1)τ
Mr
 fmin
r−b+M
e[2τ
M (σ−1)−τA]s ds
+ e[(σ−1)(τ
TM+τM )−τTA−τA]r¯−(σ−1)τMr
 r
rs1+r¯−fmin
eτ
As ds
+ e[(σ−1)(τ
TM+τM )−τTA−τA]r¯+(σ−1)τMr
 r¯
r
e[−2(σ−1)τ
M+τA]s ds
+ e[(σ−1)(τ
TM−τM )−τTA+τA]r¯+(σ−1)τMr
 fmax
r¯
e−τ
As ds
(57)
If fmin + b+M < r ≤ r¯, we obtain (53).
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Fifth, in the case of 0 < τTA/τA < 1/3 and b−A < f
min < b+M , or 1/3 ≤ τTA/τA < 1
and rs1 < f
min < b+A, if 0 < r ≤ b−M , we obtain (56). If b−M < r ≤ fmin, we obtain:
wM(r)σ − Y (0)e−(σ−1)Tr0G(0)σ−1
pAµ/LM
= e(τ
A−τTA)r¯−(σ−1)τMr
 −r¯
−fmax
eτ
As ds
+ e−(τ
TA+τA)r¯−(σ−1)τMr
 −fmid
−r¯
e−τ
As ds
+ e−(σ−1)τ
Mr
 0
−fmin
eτ
As ds
+ e−(σ−1)τ
Mr
 r
0
e[2(σ−1)τ
M−τA]s ds
+ e(σ−1)τ
Mr
 fmin
r
e−τ
As ds
+ e[(σ−1)(τ
TM+τM )−τTA−τA]r¯+(σ−1)τMr
 r¯
fmid
e[−2(σ−1)τ
M+τA]s ds
+ e[(σ−1)(τ
TM−τM )−τTA+τA]r¯+(σ−1)τMr
 fmax
r¯
e−τ
As ds
(58)
If fmin < r ≤ b+M , we obtain (50). If b+M < r ≤ rs1 + r¯ − fmin, we obtain (51). If
rs1 + r¯ − fmin < r ≤ fmin + b+M , we obtain (57). If fmin + b+M < r ≤ r¯, we obtain (53). If
r¯ < r ≤ fmin + r¯ − rs1, we obtain:
wM(r)σ − Y (0)e−(σ−1)Tr0G(0)σ−1
pAµ/LM
= e[(σ−1)(−τ
TM+τM )−τTA+τA]r¯−(σ−1)τMr
 −r¯
−fmax
eτ
As ds
+ e[(σ−1)(−τ
TM+τM )−τTA−τA]r¯−(σ−1)τMr
 −fmid
−r¯
e−τ
As ds
+ e−(σ−1)(τ
TM−τM )r¯−(σ−1)τMr
 0
−fmin
eτ
As ds
+ e−(σ−1)(τ
TM−τM )r¯−(σ−1)τMr
 b−M
0
e−τ
As ds
+ e−(σ−1)τ
Mr
 fmin
b−M
e[2(σ−1)τ
M−τA]s ds
+ e[(σ−1)(τ
TM+τM )−τTA−τA]r¯−(σ−1)τMr
 r¯
fmid
eτ
As ds
+ e[(σ−1)(τ
TM−τM )−τTA+τA]r¯−(σ−1)τMr
 r
r¯
e[2(σ−1)τ
M−τA]s ds
+ e[(σ−1)(τ
TM−τM )−τTA+τA]r¯+(σ−1)τMr
 fmin+r¯−rs1
r
e−τ
As ds
(59)
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If fmin + r¯ − rs1 < r, we obtain:
wM(r)σ − Y (0)e−(σ−1)Tr0G(0)σ−1
pAµ/LM
= e[(σ−1)(−τ
TM+τM )−τTA+τA]r¯−(σ−1)τMr
 −r¯
−fmax
eτ
As ds
+ e[(σ−1)(−τ
TM+τM )−τTA−τA]r¯−(σ−1)τMr
 −fmid
−r¯
e−τ
As ds
+ e−(σ−1)(τ
TM−τM )r¯−(σ−1)τMr
 0
−fmin
eτ
As ds
+ e−(σ−1)(τ
TM−τM )r¯−(σ−1)τMr
 b−M
0
e−τ
As ds
+ e−(σ−1)τ
Mr
 fmin
b−M
e[2(σ−1)τ
M−τA]s ds
+ e[(σ−1)(τ
TM+τM )−τTA−τA]r¯−(σ−1)τMr
 r¯
fmid
eτ
As ds
+ e[(σ−1)(τ
TM−τM )−τTA+τA]r¯−(σ−1)τMr
 fmin+r¯−rs1
r¯
e[2(σ−1)τ
M−τA]s ds
(60)
Finally, in the case of r¯ + b−A < f
min, if 0 < r ≤ b−M , we obtain:
wM(r)σ − Y (0)e−(σ−1)Tr0G(0)σ−1
pAµ/LM
= e(τ
A−τTA)r¯−(σ−1)τMr
 −r¯
−fmin
eτ
As ds
+ e−(τ
TA+τA)r¯−(σ−1)τMr
 −b+M
−r¯
e−τ
As ds
+ e−(σ−1)τ
Mr
 0
−b+M
eτ
As ds
+ e−(σ−1)τ
Mr
 r
0
e[2(σ−1)τ
M−τA]s ds
+ e(σ−1)τ
Mr
 b+M
r
e−τ
As ds
+ e[(σ−1)(τ
TM+τM )−τTA−τA]r¯+(σ−1)τMr
 r+b+M
b+M
e[−2(σ−1)τ
M+τA]s ds
+ e−(τ
TA+τA)r¯−(σ−1)τMr
 r¯
r+b+M
eτ
As ds
+ e(−τ
TA+τA)r¯−(σ−1)τMr
 fmin
r¯
e−τ
As ds (61)
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If b−M < r ≤ b+M , we obtain:
wM(r)σ − Y (0)e−(σ−1)Tr0G(0)σ−1
pAµ/LM
= e(τ
A−τTA)r¯−(σ−1)τMr
 −r¯
−fmin
eτ
As ds
+ e−(τ
TA+τA)r¯−(σ−1)τMr
 −b+M
−r¯
e−τ
As ds
+ e−(σ−1)τ
Mr
 0
−b+M
eτ
As ds
+ e−(σ−1)τ
Mr
 r
0
e[2(σ−1)τ
M−τA]s ds
+ e(σ−1)τ
Mr
 b+M
r
e−τ
As ds
+ e[(σ−1)(τ
TM+τM )−τTA−τA]r¯+(σ−1)τMr
 r¯
b+M
e[−2(σ−1)τ
M+τA]s ds
+ e[(σ−1)(τ
TM−τM )−τTA+τA]r¯+(σ−1)τMr
 fmin
r¯
e−τ
As ds
(62)
If b+M < r ≤ r¯, we obtain:
wM(r)σ − Y (0)e−(σ−1)Tr0G(0)σ−1
pAµ/LM
= e[−(σ−1)(τ
TM+τM )−τTA+τA]r¯+(σ−1)τMr
 −r¯
−fmin
eτ
As ds
+ e[−(σ−1)(τ
TM+τM )−τTA−τA]r¯+(σ−1)τMr
 −b+M
−r¯
e−τ
As ds
+ e−(σ−1)(τ
M+τTM )r¯+(σ−1)τMr
 0
−b+M
eτ
As ds
+ e−(σ−1)(τ
M+τTM )r¯+(σ−1)τMr
 r−b+M
0
e−τ
As ds
+ e−(σ−1)τ
Mr
 b+M
r−b+M
e[2τ
M (σ−1)−τA]s ds
+ e[(σ−1)(τ
TM+τM )−τTA−τA]r¯−(σ−1)τMr
 r
b+M
eτ
As ds
+ e[(σ−1)(τ
TM+τM )−τTA−τA]r¯+(σ−1)τMr
 r¯
r
e[−2(σ−1)τ
M+τA]s ds
+ e[(σ−1)(τ
TM−τM )−τTA+τA]r¯+(σ−1)τMr
 fmin
r¯
e−τ
As ds
(63)
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If r¯ < r ≤ fmin, we obtain:
wM(r)σ − Y (0)e−(σ−1)Tr0G(0)σ−1
pAµ/LM
= e[(σ−1)(−τ
TM+τM )−τTA+τA]r¯−(σ−1)τMr
 −r¯
−fmin
eτ
As ds
+ e[(σ−1)(−τ
TM+τM )−τTA−τA]r¯−(σ−1)τMr
 −b+M
−r¯
e−τ
As ds
+ e−(σ−1)(τ
TM−τM )r¯−(σ−1)τMr
 0
−b+M
eτ
As ds
+ e−(σ−1)(τ
TM−τM )r¯−(σ−1)τMr
 b−M
0
e−τ
As ds
+ e−(σ−1)τ
Mr
 b+M
b−M
e[2(σ−1)τ
M−τA]s ds
+ e[(σ−1)(τ
TM+τM )−τTA−τA]r¯−(σ−1)τMr
 r¯
b+M
eτ
As ds
+ e[(σ−1)(τ
TM−τM )−τTA+τA]r¯−(σ−1)τMr
 r
r¯
e[2(σ−1)τ
M−τA]s ds
+ e[(σ−1)(τ
TM−τM )−τTA+τA]r¯+(σ−1)τMr
 fmin
r
e−τ
As ds
(64)
If fmin < r, we obtain:
wM(r)σ − Y (0)e−(σ−1)Tr0G(0)σ−1
pAµ/LM
= e[(σ−1)(−τ
TM+τM )−τTA+τA]r¯−(σ−1)τMr
 −r¯
−fmax
eτ
As ds
+ e[(σ−1)(−τ
TM+τM )−τTA−τA]r¯−(σ−1)τMr
 −b+M
−r¯
e−τ
As ds
+ e−(σ−1)(τ
TM−τM )r¯−(σ−1)τMr
 0
−b+M
eτ
As ds
+ e−(σ−1)(τ
TM−τM )r¯−(σ−1)τMr
 b−M
0
e−τ
As ds
+ e−(σ−1)τ
Mr
 b+M
b−M
e[2(σ−1)τ
M−τA]s ds
+ e[(σ−1)(τ
TM+τM )−τTA−τA]r¯−(σ−1)τMr
 r¯
b+M
eτ
As ds
+ e[(σ−1)(τ
TM−τM )−τTA+τA]r¯−(σ−1)τMr
 fmin
r¯
e[2(σ−1)τ
M−τA]s ds
(65)
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Appendix F Derivation of the comparative analysis
on the necessary condition for sustain-
ing monocentric equilibrium
Expressing the last term of the left-hand side of (17) as C2, we obtain
∂C2
∂fmin
=
ρ(1− µ)τM{
1 + 1−e
−τAfmin
2e−τTAr¯[1−e−τA(fmin−rs1)]
}2 τA
2e−τAr¯
[
1− e−τA(fmin−rs1)]2
× e−τAfmin
(
1− e τ
A+τTA
2
r¯
)
< 0 (66)
Likewise, expressing the last term of the left-hand side of (18) as C3, we obtain
∂C3
∂fmin
= − ρ(1− µ)τ
M{
1 + 1−e
−τAb+
A
e−τTAr¯
[
2−e−τA(r¯−b
+
A
)−e−τA(fmin−r¯)
]
}2
× 1− e
−τAb+A{
e−τTAr¯
[
2− e−τA(r¯−b+A) − e−τA(fmin−r¯)
]}2 τAe−τTAr¯−τA(fmin−r¯) < 0 (67)
Since cA and N do not appear in (17) and (18), from ∂fmin/∂cA < 0 and ∂fmin/∂N > 0,
we obtain ∂C2/∂c
A > 0, ∂C2/∂N < 0, ∂C3/∂c
A > 0 and ∂C3/∂N < 0.
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